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D I S C O U R S E  A N D  L I T I G A T I O N
ancy C. arcus, LL.M., S.J.D.*
LGBT rights are at the forefront of current legal news, with
“gay marriage” and other “gay” issues visible beyond dispute in social
and legal discourse in the 21st Century. Less visible are the bisexuals
who are supposedly encompassed by the umbrella phrase “LGBT”
and by LGBT-rights litigation, but who are often left out of LGBT-
rights discourse entirely.  This Article examines the problem of bisex-
ual invisibility and erasure within LGBT-rights litigation and legal
discourse. The Article surveys the bisexual erasure legal discourse to
date, and examines the causes of bisexual erasure and its harmful
consequences for bisexuals, the broader LGBT community, and ju-
risprudential integrity as a whole. This Article contributes to the
bisexual erasure discourse through a unique examination of bisexual
erasure through a survey of relevant terminology in LGBT-rights
cases, including and beyond recent same-sex marriage litigation. The
study documents an almost complete systemic erasure of bisexuals in
briefings and opinions, including an absence of any mention of
bisexuals by majority opinions in cases where the briefings have set a
tone of bi erasure by arguing alternatively for “gay and lesbian”
rights, “gay marriage,” or “same-sex marriage,” while completely
omitting reference to bisexuals. In addition to documenting the ab-
sence of bisexuals in litigation documents (despite the actual presence
of bisexuals as litigants), this Article compiles anecdotal evidence of
bisexual erasure by attorneys, courts, and the media.
The time is overdue for more widespread inclusion of bisexual-
ity in LGBT-rights discourse and litigation. Increased bisexual in-
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School, S.J.D. University of Wisconsin Law School. This Article is dedicated to the
original bisexual erasure scholars, Professors Ruth Colker, Naomi Mezey, and Kenji
Yoshino, who first brought this dialogue to legal academia at the close of the
twentieth century; to my original BiLaw co-founders Diana Adams, Toby Adams,
Heron Greenesmith, and Ilona Turner; to our fellow BiLawrriors, the members of
BiLaw, who are growing in number every day (and please do not hesitate to contact
me if you are reading this and would like to get involved); and to the National
LGBT Bar Association, which has helped pave the path in recent years toward
greater bisexual inclusion in LGBT-rights discourse and litigation, as described in
this Article.
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clusion can provide a bridge toward more meaningful, holistic, and
accurate discourse on the rights of disenfranchised sexual minorities
in this country. The tide may finally be turning toward increased
bisexual inclusion, however, as some courts and LGBT organizations
have employed more inclusive terminology, and one federal judge has
explicitly recognized for the first time that bisexuals, like gays, are
harmed by same-sex marriage bans. Bisexuality, the last sexual ori-
entation that dare not speak its name, is finally claiming its seat at
the table of equal liberty, dignity and respect under law and in the
eyes of the LGBT-community itself. The legal community should
join this move toward more honest and holistic discourse that ac-
knowledges the equal validity of bisexuality along with other sexual
orientations. This Article is one of many steps that must be taken for
more meaningful and inclusive LGBT-rights discourse.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL AND PERSONAL PRELUDE
In recent years, the acronym “LGBT”—for “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender”—has become a widely used shorthand term of reference
for those whose sexual orientation or gender identity sets them apart from
mainstream dual-gendered heteronormative society, and who too often fall
outside the full protection of the law due to their sexual orientation or gen-
der identity. Although the term is meant to be inclusive of all sexual minori-
ties, it is too often the case that the inclusive intent underlying the use of
“LGBT” by civil rights advocates has been undermined by the less inclusive
surrounding context of its use.
In the context of LGBT-rights litigation, bisexuals have been rendered
largely invisible, from the bench1 to briefs and court opinions. Almost with-
out exception, gays and lesbians have been the exclusive focus of cases ad-
dressing sexual orientation discrimination, most recently with the rights of
same-sex couples described solely in terms of “gays and lesbians,” but not
bisexuals.
As to the other member of the “BT” contingent of “LGBT,” trans-
gender individuals have attained significant visibility and legal protections
over the years. While not as prominent in legal discourse as the “LG” con-
tingent, transgender individuals have been extended legal protections in a
number of recent court decisions.  For example, gender identity is increas-
ingly being recognized as a form of gender discrimination under Title VII,
even while sexual orientation discrimination continues to be generally un-
1. There are currently no out bisexual judges on the state or federal bench. “Pathways
to the Judiciary” Panel, National LGBT Bar Association Lavender Law Conference
(Aug. 23, 2014). See also R.J. Thompson, How Does Judicial Diversity Impact Access to
Justice for Our Communities?, LAMBDA L. BLOG (June 18, 2014), http://www.lambda
legal.org/blog/20140618_judicial-diversity-impacts-access-to-justice. At a recent Na-
tional LGBT Conference panel presentation on LGBT judges, the panelists similarly
described the absence of out bisexual judges on the federal and state bench when
asked by the author if there were any out bisexual judges on the bench.
294 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:291
protected under federal employment discrimination statutes.2 Indeed, trans-
gender litigants were among the first to litigate the issue of same-sex
marriage equality and recognition, illuminating the complex role gender can
play in various legal contexts (and perhaps begging the question of whether
the courts should be in the business of defining gender for the purpose of
denying equal rights in the first place).3 The accomplishments of trans-
gender rights advocates is due in part to an impressive transgender rights
movement which includes national organizations such as the Transgender
Law Center, the Transgender Law and Policy Institute, the Sylvia Rivera
Law Project and various transgender rights programs within the larger
LGBT rights organizations. As a result, while still far from attaining full
equal rights and necessary legal protections, transgender advocates are years
ahead of bisexuals in organizing to ensure their presence is felt and their
interests included in the larger LGBT-rights discourse.
Bisexuality,4 in contrast, has become virtually the last contingent of
the LGBT community that dare not speak its name in court, evidenced by
the comparative absence of bisexuals in LGBT-rights litigation and legal
discourse. While a scattering of legal scholars have examined why this is so,
as I will discuss in this Article, my first task in addressing the subject of
bisexual invisibility and erasure is to address why this issue matters.5
2. See infra Section III.B.4.b.
3. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999) (asserting marriage
recognition rights in context of surviving spouse medical malpractice claim); In re
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987) (denying a male-to-female transgender
individual a marriage license to marry male partner); M. T. v. J. T., 355 A.2d 204
(N.J. App. 1976) (recognizing marriage of transsexual woman to her husband for
purposes of marital support and maintenance obligations).
4. Along with other bisexual scholars and activists, I have adopted bisexual activist
Robyn Ochs’ definition of bisexuality: “I call myself bisexual because I acknowledge
that I have in myself the potential to be attracted – romantically and/or sexually – to
people of more than one sex and/or gender, not necessarily at the same time, not
necessarily in the same way, and not necessarily to the same degree.” Heron Greenes-
mith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality Fits into LGBT Legal
Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 65, 68 (2010)
(quoting Robyn Ochs, Selected Quotes by Robyn Ochs, http://www.robynochs.com/
writing/quotes.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015)); SHIRI EISNER, BI: NOTES FOR A
BISEXUAL REVOLUTION 21 (2013) (commending Ochs’ definition as “by far the
broadest and most enabling definition of bisexuality that I’ve found to date”).
5. I was moved to add this explanation about why bisexual erasure matters at the sug-
gestions of those who attended my scholarship presentation of this piece at the Cen-
tral States Law Schools Association conference at the Louisiana State University Paul
M. Hebert Law Center on October 11, 2014. The audience members were generous
with their suggestions, spelling out for me that while the importance of bi erasure
may seem obvious to those of us who have been battling it for decades, it is less
intuitively a significant problem for those who are not bisexual, who have never
given thought to the issue, and who may assume that where go gays, so go bisexuals,
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The reasons why courts, scholars, attorneys, and the broader legal
community should care about the problem of bisexual erasure are manifold.
As Part III of this Article will address, the harms suffered by bisexuals as a
result of being omitted from legal discourse and litigation range from the
stigmatizing indignity of being rendered invisible or “secondary” members
of the LGBT community to more tangible concrete harms, such as being
denied custody or immigration rights due to adjudicatory bodies viewing
bisexuality more suspiciously than other sexual orientations, or utterly fail-
ing to acknowledge its existence. In the custody context, for example, the
cases herein will illustrate that bisexuals are sometimes viewed as too unsta-
ble to be trusted as parents.6 In the immigration context, the claims of
bisexuals seeking asylum from anti-LGBT countries or seeking to emigrate
based on relationship status can be viewed with suspicion, due to confusion
about how bisexuals may validly be in a same-sex relationship at one point
and a different-sex relationship at another.7  The resulting assumption that
one of those relationships must be a “sham” relationship consequently
threatens the potential ability of bisexuals to immigrate or even be granted
asylum from countries hostile to LGBT individuals, as described in more
detail in this Article.8
It is undeniable that many rights have trickled down to the bisexual
members of the LBGT community from “gay rights” victories. In this re-
gard, bisexuals certainly owe a great deal of gratitude to the “gay rights”
movement. Nonetheless, it is also true that bisexual exclusion has a detri-
mental effect not only on bisexuals, but also on the broader LGBT commu-
nity and on jurisprudential integrity. Many bisexuals have painful stories to
recount about the emotional injury of being treated disparagingly, even by
members of the very LGBT community many bisexuals have spent decades
fighting for.9 It is essential that stories such as these be shared. As Professor
Ruth Colker wrote in the first law review essay to address the issue of bisex-
and thus bisexuals must be doing just fine in this day of dramatically increasing
LGBT rights. And while bisexuals certainly have been beneficiaries of such trickle-
down rights, and in many contexts our interests and issues are fungible with those of
gays and lesbians, this section spells out how continuing to write bisexuals out of
LGBT-rights discourse nonetheless has a variety of harmful repercussions, and not
just for bisexuals.
6. See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
7. See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
8. Id.
9. I could easily devote an entire article to recounting anecdotes about bisexual erasure,
including, in my own case, stories about LGBT groups I have volunteered for that
would not allow bisexuals a visible seat at the table, groups where I was treated with
suspicion after coming out as bisexual or, in the case of one lesbian organization,
even being flatly told that I wasn’t allowed to join. While such personal anecdotes, as
well as countless similar stories I have heard from other bisexual members of the legal
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ual jurisprudence, personal narratives are essential to counter the pervasive
failure to include bisexuals in LGBT politics and legal discourse, where the
personal truly is political.10 In her Bisexual Jurisprudence essay, Colker shares
both her thoughts and her personal experiences with the issue, and, while so
doing, poignantly emphasizes the importance of the personal narrative in
developing previously unexplored areas of jurisprudence: “The first contri-
bution that bisexuality can make to jurisprudence is . . . to encourage us to
avoid categorization and to tell stories relentlessly. Those stories are more
illuminating than theoretical attempts to define categories such as bisexual-
ity or lesbianism.”11
As a bisexual member of the legal academy and bar, I agree and am
grateful for Colker’s bravery in paving this path with powerful arguments
both political and personal; a path that, over time, will hopefully become
more welcoming toward others whose lives and realities do not conform to
stifling binary definitional boxes. There are not very many of us in the legal
academic community; at least, not many who are out of the closet and
willing to openly identify as bisexual.
There is a myriad of reasons for the bisexual closet. Too often the
closet becomes a tempting refuge from pejorative assumptions about bisexu-
als made even by our own allies in the LGBT community. Often, bisexuals
get weary of having to come out of the closet on a frequent basis to correct
assumptions based on the sex of their partners. Such assumptions may be
true of monosexuals (i.e., heterosexuals and homosexuals; or, in other
words, those attracted to only one other sex), whose sexual orientation may
be accurately assessed merely by the sex of their romantic partner. In con-
trast, for bisexuals, the assumption that our romantic partners are accurate
indicators of our sexual orientation is one that must be corrected on a regu-
lar basis.
In other words, while being in a same-sex relationship may coincide
cleanly with a gay person’s sexual orientation, and being in an opposite-sex
relationship reciprocally coincides exactly with a heterosexual person’s ori-
entation, for a bisexual person, the assumption about sexual orientation
based on the sex or gender of that person’s date, or even permanent rela-
tionship,12 is a flawed one. Bisexuals who wish to be “out of the closet”
and LGBT communities, are important, my focus in this Article is on the broader
impact and issues of bisexual erasure in LGBT litigation.
10. Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurisprudence, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 127, 127-28, 136-37
(1993). See also Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL L.
REV. 1699, 1708 (1990) (discussing the political as personal).
11. Colker, supra note 10, at 128.
12. Misunderstandings about bisexuality notwithstanding, even a bisexual person who is
married to someone of the opposite sex and never is romantic again with a same-sex
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must frequently correct such assumptions; when dating someone of the op-
posite sex we must often clarify for others that we are still bisexual, not
heterosexual (or, as female bisexuals who go from same- to opposite-sex
relationships are sometimes pejoratively called, “hasbians”13), and when dat-
ing someone of the same sex, we must often correct the assumption that the
same-sex relationship renders us gay rather than bisexual. The constant bur-
den of being the embodiment of a never-ending teachable moment that
requires a perpetual coming out of a “double closet”14 is, quite frankly,
exhausting.
Even more exhausting is the need to speak out against negative stereo-
types that at times rise to the level of denying our existence entirely. It is a
common criticism, for example, that someone who identifies as bisexual is
confused and merely going through a phase, on her way to her true gay or
lesbian orientation. These and other demeaning assumptions about bisexu-
als unfairly permeate much of the dialogue that exists about bisexuals.15
At this critical historical juncture in LGBT-rights history, it is impera-
tive that bisexuals not be rendered invisible in civil rights battles against
discrimination. Despite the fact that bisexuals have played important roles
in the development of LGBT rights, we have often done so behind the
scenes, presumed to be gay or straight unless we are willing to come out of
the closet on a frequent basis to correct common false assumptions of
monosexual orientation.
While, ultimately, the greatest responsibility lies with bisexuals to keep
coming out to ensure our own visibility, a shared responsibility lies both
with our advocates, to include us in LGBT-rights arguments, and with the
courts, to include us in LGBT-rights analyses and holdings in a positive
manner. At this moment in history when the basic fairness of treating gays
and lesbians with equal dignity has gripped the heartstrings of America, it is
partner is still bisexual to the same degree as a polyamorous bisexual person who has
both a male and female romantic partner (which is a less common form of bisexual
romantic relationships than the more traditional marriage model). See Michael Bou-
cai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 415, 450 (2012).
13. “There is, in fact, a word for traitors: hasbians. It is a powerful pun that invokes the
abyss of not being what you had been thought to be, of really being nothing.”
Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity
Classification Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 117 (1995). See also
Colker, supra note 10, at 129 (describing how she was derogatorily dubbed a “has-
bian” after marrying a man).
14. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1795 (1996) (“The trope of the double closet marks
the situation in which a person is a member of two minority groups for which the
closet is a shaping influence.”).
15. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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time for bisexuals to demand and be accorded the same respect16 and recog-
nition as our gay (and straight) friends.
Although bisexuals are relatively invisible in the halls of both court-
houses and the legal academy, there are a small but growing number of legal
scholars who in recent years have addressed the phenomenon of bisexual
invisibility in LGBT-rights discourse, as described in more detail in Part I of
this Article. This Article continues that dialogue and examines the problem
of bisexual erasure in the context of recent litigation, including and beyond
same-sex marriage litigation.
Part II of this Article documents anecdotal and statistical evidence of
bisexual erasure in LGBT litigation, as well as the origins of “bi erasure” as a
subject of legal scholarship. I discuss various anecdotal examples of bisexual
erasure, including regrettable incidents in which both LGBT-rights lawyers
and media covering same-sex marriage litigation have engaged in bisexual
erasure, for example, by misrepresenting or explaining away the sexual ori-
entation of litigants who did not fit cleanly into a pure homosexual cate-
gory. Building upon the work of past scholars who have brought such
incidents to light, I conducted a survey of the relevant terminology used in
LGBT-rights litigation. The results of this study, set forth in Part II, reveal
an almost complete systemic erasure of bisexuals in briefings and opinions,
evidenced by the lack of any mention of bisexuals. Critically, in cases where
the briefings have set the tone by mentioning “gay and lesbian” rights, or
otherwise employed language that omits any reference to bisexuals, the
courts have generally followed suit with similar non-inclusive language.
Part III addresses the negative consequences of bisexual erasure in
LGBT-rights discourse and litigation. Such consequences, Part III explains,
include problems with court opinions perpetuating inaccurate portrayals of
the LGBT community as well as other harms. This Part addresses harms
specific to bisexuals in contexts including immigration and family law, as
well as harms to the LGBT community and to jurisprudential integrity re-
sulting from the erasure of bisexuality from LGBT-rights discourse.
Finally, Part IV offers suggestions for turning the page toward a new
chapter of greater bisexual inclusion in LGBT-rights discourse and litiga-
tion.  This section highlights some of the (sadly, still too rare) examples of
recent advances toward greater bisexual inclusivity evidenced by (1) the use
of more inclusive terminology by some courts, which falls short of explicit
recognition of bisexuality as on par with lesbian and gay issues, but none-
theless implicitly keeps the door open for bisexual inclusivity; (2) the ex-
16. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guar-
antee of liberty are linked in important respects . . . .”).
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plicit recognition by one federal appellate judge that bisexuals are, like
lesbians and gays, victims of marriage inequality, in an opinion that illus-
trates the utility of bi inclusion in legal analysis; and (3) the recent efforts of
some LGBT organizations to be more inclusive of bisexuals in discourse and
litigation, which has enabled the formation of the first ever national BiLaw
organization. Despite these positive developments, however, there is much
more work that must still be done and much room for improvement. The
tendency toward bisexual erasure in LGBT-rights cases culminated recently
in the almost complete erasure of bisexuals from both the briefs and the
final opinion in the Supreme Court same-sex marriage case, Obergefell v.
Hodges,17 even despite efforts by BiLaw—through its amicus brief and direct
outreach to attorneys in the case—to be more bi-inclusive.
On a final note in this introduction, while I realize that it is uncom-
mon in a doctrinal article to frequently revert to first person and anecdotal
language, I find it necessary to do so throughout this Article because, at the
core, this critical issue is personal, not just political and legal. The exposi-
tion of bisexual erasure is at once both theoretical analysis and an intimate
narrative for me. I welcome you to my world, and hope that you follow me
to the end of this analysis and be open to my non-conventionality on this
front. After all, flexibility and willingness to change linguistic traditions play
important roles in this Article’s ultimate conclusion, in which I hope to
help facilitate a brighter path, a bridge toward greater bisexual inclusivity.
II. THE DOCUMENTATION AND DISCOURSE OF BISEXUAL ERASURE
This is a historic era of change and progress for LGBT rights, particu-
larly in regard to marriage equality, a dramatically and rapidly evolving area
of litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision.
While there are still a number of states that do not accord include full civil
rights protections to LGBT individuals in other contexts, such as employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations,18 this number is decreasing by
17. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
18. As of the writing of this Article, only nineteen states and D.C. extended protections
against employment and housing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity, and only seventeen states and D.C. accorded protections against
public accommodation discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. See Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http:/
/www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last updated Sept. 9,
2015).  Those numbers are significantly higher, however, than in 2008, when only
thirteen states provided anti-discrimination protections against sexual orientation
and gender identity discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommo-
dations, and dramatically higher than in 1992, when only eight states protected
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (gender identity not yet
being commonly protected along with sexual orientation at that point). See Matt
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the day. As society’s acceptance of LGBT individuals has grown in the con-
text of marriage equality and beyond, the body of LGBT-rights law has
correspondingly developed into a holistic web of protections, an incomplete
but increasingly cohesive patchwork of legal rights and recognitions.
Despite the growing body of legal protections for LGBT individuals
generally, there is a dearth of litigation in which the rights of bisexuals spe-
cifically have been addressed. Although the bisexuality of litigants has been
noted in the rare, exceptional case,19 bisexuality as an orientation just as
worthy of protection as homosexuality has generally not been addressed in
any substantive manner by courts in this country, as this section will address
in more detail, and as detailed in the Appendix to this Article.20 There has
been an absence of (acknowledged) bisexual parties in impact litigation and
a general lack of reference to bisexuals in briefs and court filings addressing
LGBT rights.21 For the most part, and perhaps as a result, court opinions
have mirrored this lack of inclusive terminology in their corresponding
opinions.
A. The Origins of “Bisexual Erasure”
Although there has been a noticeable lack of bisexual inclusivity in
LGBT-rights litigation, there has been a growing discourse on bisexual is-
sues in legal scholarship. Ruth Colker’s original call for a bisexual jurispru-
Foreman, Gay Is Good, 32 NOVA L. REV. 557, 560 n.14 (2008); Elvia Rosales Arri-
ola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons As A Discrete and Insular
Minority, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 263, 266 (1992).
19. See Flood v. Bank of Am. Corp., 780 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015) (describing plaintiff’s
allegations “that her former employers . . . subjected her to a special set of rules and
standards, and otherwise discriminated against her, because of her bisexuality” and
vacating summary judgment on the wrongful termination and hostile environment
claims resulting from the alleged discrimination). See also Rowland v. Mad River
Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (also involving a discrimination
claim by a plaintiff fired after coming out to her supervisor and colleagues as bisex-
ual) and Dawkins v. Richmond Cnty. Schs., No. 1:12CV414, 2012 WL 1580455 at
*2 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2012) (“The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is ‘a bisexual/gay
male’”).
20. See infra Appendix.
21. In the area of employment discrimination, Ann Tweedy and Karen Yescavage have
recently documented the lack of published cases addressing claims by bisexuals, and
observed that even in those cases where bisexuals have brought forth employment
discrimination claims, “it seems to be virtually unheard of for a bisexual plaintiff to
succeed in such a claim on the merits.” Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employ-
ment Discrimination Against Bisexuals: An Emperical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 699, 709-10 (2015). There has been one recent exception to the lack
of successful employment discrimination cases brought by bisexuals: Flood, 780 F.3d
1.
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dence has been answered by other legal scholars, a number of whom have
added to the bisexual jurisprudence over the years and collectively developed
a body of scholarship examining the problem of bisexual invisibility and
erasure in law and society.
The bisexual invisibility discourse in legal scholarship began with
Colker’s 1993 article examining the need for a bisexual jurisprudence.22
Two years later, Professor Naomi Mezey added to this dialogue.23 In her
1995 article, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual
Identity Classification, Mezey challenged dichotomous hetero/homo-norma-
tive identity classifications and exposed the limitations of act-focused sexual-
ity categories, spelling out how “homosexual conduct”—the Court’s focus
in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick—is a misnomer that excludes bisexual-
ity and fails to capture the reality of homosexual and heterosexual conduct
as well.24 Mezey proposed a non-binary reclassification of sexual identity
that deconstructs common couplings of identity and conduct and demands
a more critical perspective about sexual identity that would embrace bisexu-
ality and sexual fluidity beyond artificially exclusive dichotomies.25
The bisexual jurisprudence dialogue continued through subsequent le-
gal scholarship by Colker and Mezey26 and was eventually joined by other
legal scholars.  In 2000, Professor Kenji Yoshino continued the bisexual ju-
risprudence dialogue with his article The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Era-
sure, which coined the phrase “bisexual erasure” (or “bi erasure”).27
Following the work of Colker and Mezey in his discussion of bisexual invisi-
bility, Yoshino attributed that invisibility to the common (if subconscious)
interests gay and straight communities may share in minimizing the exis-
tence of bisexuals through various forms of bi erasure, and explored possible
motivating factors underlying bisexual invisibility.28 Yoshino explained that
the invisibility of bisexuality in LGBT litigation cannot fairly be justified by
reference to demographics because bisexuals constitute a large percentage of
22. Colker, supra note 10.
23. Mezey, supra note 13.
24. Id. at 102-03, 122-32.
25. Id. at 99-100, 132-33.
26. See RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS
UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15-38 (1996) [hereinafter COLKER, HYBRID]; Ruth Colker,
An Embodied Bisexual Perspective, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163 (1995) [hereinafter
Colker, Embodied Bisexual Perspective]; Ruth Colker, Response: Hybrid Revisited, 100
GEO. L.J. 1069 (2012); Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and
the National Imagination, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1701 (2003); Naomi Mezey, Response:
The Death of the Bisexual Saboteur, 100 GEO. L.J. 1093 (2012).
27. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 353 (2000).
28. See id. at 356-430.
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the LGBT population.29 Thus their invisibility in American law is vastly
disproportionate to their actual existence, and is more accurately classified
as “bisexual erasure.”30
The most recent demographic data on LGBT populations continues
to support Yoshino’s findings; the number of bisexuals within the LGBT
community remains significantly higher than one might gather from their
lack of mention in litigation. Of the millions of individuals who identify as
LGBT,31 by all recent counts, bisexuals are comparable in size to gay men
and lesbians, and bisexual women outnumber lesbian women. For example,
in a recent survey of LGBT individuals, the Pew Research Center estimated
that 57% identify as gay or lesbian, while 43% identify as bisexual; a survey
by Dr. Gary Gates of the Williams Institute estimated that 48% identify as
gay or lesbian, while 52% identify as bisexual; and a GSS (General Social
Survey) data estimated that 47% identify as gay or lesbian, while 52% iden-
tify as bisexual.32 The Pew survey further reported that 31% of women
surveyed identified as bisexual, while only 20% identified as lesbian; the
Gates survey reported that 33% identified as bisexual and 17% as lesbian;
and the GSS survey reported that 37% identified as bisexual and 22% as
lesbian.33
While exact numbers are debatable, the general point is relatively in-
disputable: any invisibility of bisexuality in LGBT discourse cannot be ex-
plained in terms of bisexuals’ nonexistence. Rather, bisexual invisibility may
be attributable to a lack of awareness of their existence, caused, perhaps, by
the disproportionate number of bisexuals who are more likely to be “clos-
eted” than gays and lesbians. To wit, while only 28% of those who identify
as bisexual describe themselves as out of the closet, a substantially higher
number of gays—77% of gay men and 71% of lesbians—are out of the
closet.34
However, even with bisexuals being comparatively more closeted (as to
the potential causes of bisexual erasure in LGBT-rights litigation specifi-
cally) it is doubtful that LGBT-rights attorneys, in framing their arguments,
29. See id. at 388.
30. See id.
31. Gary J. Gates, How Many People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender?, WIL-
LIAMS INSTITUTE 1 (April 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf.
32. GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER CIVIL RIGHTS: A PUBLIC POLICY
AGENDA FOR UNITING A DIVIDED AMERICA (Wallace Swan ed. 2015).
33. Id.
34. Kim Parker, Among LGBT Americans, Bisexuals Stand Out When It Comes to Identity,
Acceptance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2015/02/20/among-lgbt-americans-bisexuals-stand-out-when-it-comes-to-
identity-acceptance/.
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leave out references to bisexuals because we are not on their radar at all.
This is especially the case considering the recent proactive outreach ex-
tended to LGBT-rights lawyers by bisexual activists seeking to increase the
visibility of bisexuals in LGBT-rights litigation.  During the period of time
when the multitude of LGBT-rights lawyers representing the multiple par-
ties in the same-sex marriage Obergefell v. Hodges were preparing their merits
briefs to the Supreme Court, for example, I sent drafts of this Article to each
main lawyer listed for the case, imploring them to consider bi-inclusive lan-
guage in the briefing.  My efforts were largely futile; only one main party
brief referred to bisexuality, and with only a single reference,35 as compared
to numerous references to “lesbians and gays” as the class harmed by same-
sex marriage bans.36
So why the omission? Why, at this exciting juncture in LGBT civil
rights history, where the trajectory toward equal rights continues steadfastly
every day, is there a continued reluctance to include reference to bisexuals in
LGBT-rights litigation?
Yoshino offers a number of explanations for the origins of bisexual
erasure. Overall, he suggests, bisexual erasure is attributable to the shared
interest of gays and straights in preserving strict binary sexual orientation
dichotomies, as they both view the comparably fluid orientation presented
by bisexuality as a threat.37 Yoshino breaks down the motivating drives un-
derlying what he coins as “bisexual erasure” into three areas. First, he ex-
plains, those who stifle discussions of bisexuality do so because they fear that
so long as bisexuality is a valid possibility, the monosexual (i.e., gay or
straight) identity can no longer be fairly inferred by one’s partnerships and
is thereby destabilized as a default identity.38 Second, he offers, they are
threatened by a world in which sex is no longer the primary distinguishing
35. “The Sixth Circuit’s historical analysis is wrong. Invidious discrimination against
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals did not begin in the 1970s with Anita Bryant or
criminal laws targeting gay people specifically.” Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 860738, at *43.
36. See infra Appendix.
37. Yoshino, supra note 27, at 402-10.
38. In a poignant illustration of this fear, Yoshino quotes the following story related
from bisexual activist Robyn Ochs: “When I have asked gay men to explain their
fears about bisexuality and bisexual people, one theme has repeatedly arisen. As one
gay man put it, ‘Coming out as gay was the hardest and most painful thing I have
ever done in my life. Now I’m finally at a place where I have a solid identity, a
community, a place to call home. Bisexuals make me uncomfortable because their
existence raises for me the possibility that I might be bisexual myself. And coming to
terms with my identity was so hard for me the first time around, I cringe at the
thought of having to go through such a long, hard, painful process a second time.’”
Id. at 402.
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characteristic of attraction.39 Finally, some (rather unfairly, but com-
monly)40 associate bisexuality with dangers such as HIV concerns, assump-
tions of non-monogamy, and the perception that bisexuals are
assimilationists who can, unlike gays, avail themselves of “heterosexual
privilege.”41
In addition to outlining various causes of bisexual erasure, Yoshino
identifies three forms of bisexual erasure: 1) categorical class erasure,
through which some contend there is no such thing as bisexuality at all, 2)
individual erasure, such as when celebrities come out as bisexual but are
nonetheless reported as being gay rather than bisexual, and 3) delegitimiza-
tion, i.e., minimizing the bisexual identity through disparaging stereotypes
such as describing bisexuals as “fence-sitters,” confused, unstable, or
promiscuous.42
LGBT-rights attorneys cannot fairly be accused of engaging in the
third type of erasure in their briefings, which are not the least bit hostile
toward bisexuals in tone. Regardless, the bisexual invisibility in their brief-
ing documented in the Appendix of this Article may be attributable to stra-
tegic motivations for bisexual exclusion. Bisexual erasure in litigation could
perhaps be the result of advocates’ efforts to offer the courts what they view
as more palatable, straightforward messaging.
Even if the choice to omit bisexuals from the face of LGBT-rights
litigation were intentional and strategic, the intent may nonetheless be rela-
tively benign, accompanied by the assumption that omitting bisexuals will
not hurt us because eventually the rights gained by gays as a named class
39. Id. at 402-10.
40. Previous studies have shown that bisexual men are less at risk to contract STIs and
HIV than are gay men, but as William Jeffries of the Division of HIV/AIDS at the
Center for Disease Control’s National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, and
TB Prevention reports, “Societal biphobia—negative attitudes and behaviors toward
bisexual individuals—is more prevalent than antigay sentiment” and “[i]t is some-
times perpetrated by lesbians and gay men, and public health professionals who in-
teract with MSMW. Biphobia can manifest in erroneous beliefs that MSMW are
closeted gay men and, particularly for black men, responsible for HIV transmission
to women.” See Eliel Cruz, Study: Biphobia Puts Bisexual Men at Risk for STIs, THE
ADVOCATE (June 26, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.advocate.com/bisexuality/2014/
06/26/study-biphobia-puts-bisexual-men-risk-stis.
41. See Lisa Orlando, Loving Whom We Choose, in BI ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL
PEOPLE SPEAK OUT 224 (Loraine Hutchins & Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1st ed. 1991)
(“[T]he lesbian and gay community abounds with negative images of bisexuals as
fence-sitters, traitors, cop-outs, closet cases, people whose primary goal in life is to
retain ‘heterosexual privilege,’ power-hunger seducers who use and discard their
same-sex lovers like so many Kleenex.”). See generally Colker, supra note 10, at 132-
34 (discussing how bisexuals must deal with the distrust of the gay and lesbian
community).
42. See Yoshino, supra note 27, at 396-99.
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will trickle back down to the unnamed bisexuals. A “trickle down rights”
justification for bisexual erasure, however, is not so different from the simi-
lar, now widely-decried, excuses made for leaving transgender protections
out of earlier versions of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,43 for
which even those groups originally proposing a “non-inclusive” ENDA have
now apologized.44 Furthermore, such a shortsighted strategy that is overly
focused on winning immediate battles leads to missed opportunities that
can be critical for more meaningful long-term successes in securing rights
and in rectifying fallacious gender jurisprudence, as discussed in Section III.
B.4, infra.
Since Yoshino dubbed the phrase “bi erasure,” several other legal
scholars, including Elizabeth Glazer,45 Ann Tweedy,46 and Michael Boucai47
have engaged in substantial discussions of bisexual erasure in their legal
scholarship, along with a scattering of advocates outside the academy who
added their voices to the dialogue within law journals.48 In their respective
bi erasure articles, Glazer describes the erasure of bisexuals in terms of insuf-
ficient paradigms of sexual orientation, Tweedy documents unique employ-
ment discrimination hurdles faced by bisexuals, and Boucai takes on the
problem of bisexual erasure in the context of same-sex marriage litigation.49
Boucai’s article describes bisexuality as “ ‘virtually invisible’ in same-
sex marriage litigation,” and criticizes what he describes as “ ‘LGBT advo-
cates’ meticulous avoidance of the subject” of bisexuality.50 Boucai suggests
specific reasons underlying this strategic bisexual erasure in marriage litiga-
tion, including how bisexuality is viewed as undermining the arguments
that discrimination against same-sex couples is anti-homosexual discrimina-
tion, that same-sex marriage bans are sexual orientation discrimination, and
that obtaining heightened scrutiny for LGBT litigants’ claims requires suc-
43. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L. J. 997, 1014-16 (2012)
(describing the strategic exclusion of transgender people from various drafts of
ENDA until increased public support for trans-inclusivity led to a more inclusive
version of the bill).
44. See Chuck Colbert, HRC Apologizes to Trans Community, Pledges Push for Broad
LGBT Bill, BAY AREA REPORTER (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.ebar.com/news/arti-
cle.php?sec=news&article=70003 (summarizing the apology of Chad Griffin,
Human Rights Campaign President, for failing to represent the transgender
community).
45. See Glazer, supra note 43.
46. See Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 21.
47. See Boucai, supra note 12, at 415.
48. See, e.g., Greenesmith, supra note 4, at 65; Katherine Francys Lambrose, Note, Get-
ting Back to Sex: The Need to Refine Current Anti-Discrimination Statutes to Include
All Sexual Minorities, 39 STETSON L. REV. 925, 942-49 (2010).
49. See Boucai, supra note 12, at 415.
50. Id. at 452-53.
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cessful application of immutability principles.51 One by one, Boucai rebuts
each of these justifications for bisexual erasure. For example, he points out
how same-sex marriage bans apply regardless of sexual orientation, and he
contends that even if bisexuality were somehow viewed as less immutable
than other sexual orientations, which is highly questionable, immutability is
no longer required for heightened scrutiny in current constitutional
jurisprudence.52
Although varying in focus and analyses, the legal scholarship address-
ing bisexuality in the law has generally reflected a general consensus that the
absence of bisexuals in LGBT discourse and litigation is evidence not of the
nonexistence of bisexuality, but rather, of its erasure by members of other
sexual orientations.
B. Anecdotal Evidence of Bisexual Erasure in LGBT Litigation
Over the years, bisexual erasure scholars have collected and presented
anecdotal evidence of bisexual erasure, demonstrating that even advocates of
LGBT rights have, at times, perpetuated bi erasure. In her Bisexual Jurispru-
dence article, Ruth Colker tells the story of how, during a 1992 symposium,
the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project presented as a seminal “gay
rights” victory the case of Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, in-
volving the vindication of a school guidance counselor who successfully
sued upon being fired when she came out to her employers.  Colker re-
counts how, at a Law & Sexuality symposium, even while hailing Rowland
as a landmark case vindicating the right to be out about one’s true sexual
orientation, the [then]53 ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project director
reportedly misrepresented the plaintiff’s true sexual orientation when he de-
scribed her as a lesbian although she had in fact been fired for coming out as
bisexual.54 Thus, while he “believed Rowland was a very important case in
the field of lesbian and gay rights, he did not acknowledge that it, in fact,
involved a bisexual.”55 This example of individual erasure by an LGBT-
rights organization is particularly unfortunate in light of the lack of success-
ful employment discrimination challenges brought by bisexual victims of
51. Id. at 419-20, 460-72.
52. Id. at 469-472.
53. Not only is the director no longer the same, but the project these days has a more bi-
inclusive name as well; it is now the ACLU LGBT Project and is directed by Louise
Melling. See ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights (last visited Sep. 15, 2015);
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/bio/louise-melling (last visited Sep. 15, 2015).
54. See Colker, supra note 10 at 134 (citing Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730
F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984)). The court in Rowland unambiguously described
plaintiff as “bisexual.”
55. Id.
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employment discrimination, despite the numbers of bisexuals being compa-
rable (and arguably greater, in the case of openly bisexual employees) to gays
and lesbians who suffer employment discrimination.56
The conflation of bisexuality with homosexuality has occurred in
court cases as well, with particularly significant and troubling results in the
instance of the Supreme Court itself engaging in bisexual erasure in Romer
v. Evans.57 In that case, Colorado Amendment 2 (which the Court ulti-
mately struck down) had explicitly prohibited civil rights protections for
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, with the text of the amendment prohibiting
any “Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orienta-
tion.”58 Despite the amendment’s text explicitly including bisexuals, how-
ever, the Court stated that it would be referring throughout the opinion
solely as “homosexuals or gays or lesbians.”59 As Natasha Silber comments,
“by structuring the named class as homosexual persons, and excluding
bisexuals,” the Court in Romer “reified the construct of the gay-straight
binary.”60
Why did the Romer Court drop “bisexual” from its vernacular?  A
closer look at the briefs of the LGBT-rights advocates in that case provides
the answer.  The respondents’ brief sent an initial signal that condoned sub-
suming bisexuality within the umbrella label (in effect, erasing bisexuals)
with the statement: “Nevertheless, Amendment 2 prevents gay people - and
only gay people - from bringing ‘any . . . claim of discrimination’ under § 24-
34-402.5 for relief from discrimination based on ‘homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’ ”61  The brief con-
tinued to signal that “bisexual” should be subsumed under the heading
“gay,” and to maintain that only gay individuals were affected by the
Amendment despite the more expansive language of the offending state
constitutional provision:
Amendment 2 Intentionally Excludes Only Gay People from
Equal Opportunity to Participate in the Political Process.
There can be no question that the plain language of Amendment
2 specifically targets gay people: Amendment 2 deprives persons
56. For a discussion of employment discrimination against bisexuals, see Tweedy & Yes-
cavage, supra note 21, at 699.
57. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996).
58. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)).
59. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
60. Natasha J. Silber, Unscrambling the Egg: Social Constructionism and the Antireification
Principle in Constitutional Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1899 (2013).
61. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039), 1995 WL 17008447, at *11 (emphasis added).
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of any remedy for discrimination only to the extent that govern-
ment or others discriminate on ““the basis of” ‘homosexual, les-
bian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or
relationships.’ Thus, Amendment 2 specifically bars only gay
people from seeking a basic kind of “protection of the laws” that
any other group is free to seek and obtain. . . . .
In addition to Amendment 2’s facially discriminatory applica-
tion to gay people alone, the record of this case also shows that
Amendment 2 was intended to render ineffective only gay per-
sons’ political efforts to seek protection against public and pri-
vate discrimination.62
The Court, following these cues from LBGT-rights attorneys them-
selves, subsequently made bisexual erasure even more explicit, marking the
turning point toward almost complete bisexual erasure from LGBT opin-
ions.  As revealed in this Article’s Appendix, which traces the evolving ter-
minology of LGBT litigation following the Romer Court’s litigant-approved
bisexual erasure, the word “bisexual” almost entirely disappeared from the
face of all subsequent Supreme Court opinions addressing LGBT rights. In
contrast, prior to Romer, in cases where LGBT-rights litigants themselves
were bi-inclusive in their brief-drafting, so too was the Court.63
Romer thus marked a historic and disturbing shift in jurisprudential
linguistics, the point at which bisexuals were erased from the face of Su-
preme Court litigation addressing sexual orientation.
More recent examples of bisexual erasure in LGBT-rights litigation by
LGBT-rights attorneys are even more disturbing. Yoshino and Colker both
have described, for example, a troubling line of questioning to which attor-
ney Ted Olson subjected his own witness, Sandy Steir, during the Proposi-
tion 8 trial leading to the Supreme Court Perry case. In that case, Steir and
her wife Kris Perry were among those couples challenging California’s same-
sex marriage ban. Steir, however, was not what some call a “gold star” les-
bian, i.e., a lesbian who has never been in a single heterosexual relation-
ship.64 To the contrary, she was previously married to a man before meeting
Perry, a fact that came out at trial. On the stand, Olson subjected Steir to
62. Id. at *33 (footnote omitted).
63. See infra Appendix (especially data for Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)).
64. See Kathy Belge, Gold Star Lesbian, ABOUT.COM, http://lesbianlife.about.com/od/
comingout/g/GoldStar.htm (last visited Sep. 15, 2004) (“A gold star lesbian is a
lesbian who has never slept with a man and has no intention of ever sleeping with a
man”).
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invasive questioning about her sexual orientation, apparently to preemp-
tively address questions the State might raise, demanding of his client,
“How convinced are you that you are gay? You’ve lived with a husband. You
said you loved him. Some people might say, Well, it’s this and then it’s that
and it could be this again. Answer that.”65 In response, Steir explained away
her previous marriage by testifying that the only time in her life she had
fallen in love had been in her relationship with Kris Perry.66 Under Ted
Olson’s questioning, Steir disavowed having ever been in love with her ex-
husband.67
In this exchange, it is not Steir’s answer that is troubling so much as
Olson’s apparent need to engage in such an offensive line of direct examina-
tion in the first place, which begs the underlying question of whether it
would have mattered if Steir had answered that she had in fact been in love
with her husband when she married him, just as she was now in love with
Kris Perry.  Couldn’t that have indeed been the case if she was, in fact,
bisexual, and so what if it was? Should it have mattered that she was previ-
ously married to a man, and whether she had been in love with him? A
paramount argument for same-sex marriage equality, after all, is that the
fundamental right to marry applies to all people, regardless of sexual orien-
tation. And yet, the presumption implicit in Olson’s line of questioning is
that if a party to a same-sex partnership is 100% homosexual, only then is
she or he entitled to equal marriage rights.
In at least three other incidents, bisexuals have been erased from the
face of recent same-sex marriage litigation. First, during the 2005 Marriage
Cases litigation challenging the sufficiency of California’s Domestic Partner
Act, the LGBT-rights lawyers, in the course of discussing the state’s legisla-
tive determination that “many lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians have
formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships with person of the same
sex,”68 engaged in bisexual erasure.  In other words, rather than accurately
quote the state’s findings regarding lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, their briefs
erased the word “bisexual” and instead described the State as denying only
“lesbians and gay men” the right to marry.69
In another incident covered by LGBT media, Robyn Ochs, one of the
most prominent bisexual visibility advocates in the country, was nonetheless
65. Transcript of Proceedings at 166-67, Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 704 F. Supp.2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C-09-2292-VRW), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-10.pdf.
66. Id. at 167.
67. Id. at 165.
68. Respondent’s Brief at 1, 6, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App.
2005)(No. A110449), 2005 WL 3967315.
69. Id.
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incorrectly described as a lesbian by media accounts highlighting her promi-
nent role as a plaintiff in a historic same-sex marriage case.70 The Washing-
ton Post exclusive story on her wedding to her wife, for example, described
the two as lesbians, to Ochs’ dismay; she explained in a later article that the
incident was troubling “because one of the challenges of identifying as bi-
sexual is dealing with repeated erasure. . . . My identity is hard-won—I
worked very hard and for a very long time to come to a place of comfort
and pride about who I am, and it matters to me that people see me accu-
rately.”71 Subsequently, one LGBT newspaper interviewing Ochs described
that incident as “the very thing Ochs works to eradicate happen[ing] to
her,” because Ochs “has dedicated her career to educating straight and
LGBT people alike on the bisexual community,” and “is known for speak-
ing nationally on bi erasure, biphobia, and monosexism (the idea that heter-
osexuality or homosexuality is superior to non-monosexual orientations).”72
Most recently, as previously described, as a member of the first na-
tional organization of bisexual lawyers, law professors and law students, Bi-
Law, I reached out to over a dozen lawyers representing the various
petitioners in the Supreme Court’s landmark Obergefell marriage equality
decision.  Not only did I send early drafts of this Article to them, imploring
bisexual inclusivity in the Supreme Court briefing, but BiLaw filed an ami-
cus brief with the Court, prior to the filing of several of the final merits
briefs in that case,73 again seeking bisexual inclusivity in the discussion of
same-sex couples’ rights in that case, all to no avail.  In the end, only one
party’s brief—that of the lead plaintiff in the case, Mr. Obergefell—men-
tioned bisexuals, and it did so only once.74  Here, again, the Court followed
the lead of the LGBT-rights lawyers in that case, and completely omitted
bisexuals from the final decision.75
Each of these examples of bisexual erasure fits within Yoshino’s first
and second bisexual erasure categories, i.e., the categorical and individual
bisexual erasure categories.76 To elaborate, the recasting of the bisexual Row-
land plaintiff and of bisexual activist Robyn Ochs as lesbians are both exam-
70. See Eliel Cruz, When Bisexual People Get Left Out of Marriage, THE ADVOCATE (Au-
gust 26, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.advocate.com/bisexuality/2014/08/26/when-
bisexual-people-get-left-out-marriage (“Ochs not only identifies as bisexual but is a
renowned bisexual activist”).
71. Id.
72. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
73. Brief for Bilaw as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-574), 2015 WL 1041665.
74. Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 860738, at
*43.
75. Id.
76. Yoshino, supra note 27, at 365-67.
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ples of individual erasure. The Romer litigants’ and the Supreme Court’s
erasure of bisexuals from the named class in that case, despite bisexuals hav-
ing been enumerated in the Colorado amendment language, is an example
of categorical erasure. Ted Olson’s examination of his witness in Perry, a line
of questioning that demanded his client explain away any apparent bisexual
orientation, effectually erasing her past opposite-sex relationship, was simi-
larly a form of categorical erasure. Finally, the Obergefell briefs’ and majority
opinion’s failure to mention bisexuals, even after being lobbied to be bi-
inclusive, may also be considered a form of categorical erasure, to the extent
that bisexuals are treated as nonexistent by the language in the briefs and
opinions describing same-sex couples as being comprised only of gay and
lesbian people, and same-sex marriage bans only affecting gays.
To be fair, the intent of LGBT-rights advocates, courts, and members
of the media who engage in such erasure is certainly benign compared to
those who engage in disparaging delegitimization (Yoshino’s third category
of erasure). While not engaging in such blatantly discriminatory treatment
of bisexuals, however, it is incumbent upon LGBT rights advocates, courts,
members of the media, and all others engaged in LGBT-rights discourse to
honor, rather than erase, bisexuality as a valid sexual orientation.
C. Statistical Data on Bisexual Erasure in Litigation: A Survey of
Terminology in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation and
LGBT-Rights Supreme Court Cases
To supplement this anecdotal evidence and more fully assess current
trends in bisexual-exclusive LGBT terminology, and in an effort to pinpoint
the current landscape of bisexual (in)visibility in LGBT litigation terminol-
ogy, I engaged in a survey of LGBT terminology in LGBT rights cases. The
study, detailed in the attached Appendix, examined relevant terminology
within Supreme Court opinions related to LGBT rights, and also within the
briefs and opinions in federal appellate same-sex marriage decisions follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s Windsor and Perry decisions. Specifically, through
term searches of the main party briefs and majority opinions in those cases,
the survey tracked the appearance of the word “bisexual,” as compared to
“gay,” “lesbian,” “homosexual,” “same-sex,” and “LGBT.”77
Not surprisingly, as the survey results in the Appendix of this Article
reveal, the word “bisexual” cannot be found in the vast majority of LGBT
rights court opinions and briefs, in contrast with the frequent appearance of
“gay,” “lesbian,” and “homosexual.”78 The umbrella term “LGBT” has not
77. See infra Appendix.
78. Id.
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been used at all by the courts and litigants in these cases.79 However, the
phrase “same-sex” has become the Supreme Court’s preferred umbrella term
(at least in the cases addressing rights of same-sex couples), which the Court
used exclusively in Windsor and Perry.80 The briefs of the LGBT-rights ad-
vocates in those cases, in contrast, alternated between references to “same-
sex couples” and “lesbian and gays.”81 It remains to be seen, however, if
“same-sex” will continue to translate into an inclusive umbrella catch phrase
in future cases where the rights at issue arise in the context of individuals,
not couples.
The erasure of “bisexual” in both opinions and briefs dates back to
Romer, as previously explained. The use of the word phrase “same-sex mar-
riage,” without specifically referencing the gay, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
tion of those who enter into same-sex marriage, is a relatively new
occurrence in Supreme Court opinions, compared to the disappearance of
“bisexual” from the Court’s vernacular after the Court followed the LGBT-
rights lawyers’ lead in Romer.82 In contrast, there had been a brief moment
in Supreme Court jurisprudence when bisexuals were mentioned nearly as
frequently as homosexuals: in the case of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,83 a case in which the plaintiff’s
name itself included bisexuals. The litigants in that case, challenging the
exclusion of the “Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group” from the St. Patrick’s
Day parade in Boston were clearly, as their name indicated, bisexual-inclu-
sive. So, consequently, was the Supreme Court, at least in that case. But the
bisexual inclusivity lasted only a short time; it was a year later that the
LGBT-rights litigants in Romer dropped “bisexual” from the named class,
signaling to the Court that it could do the same, and the Court did so,
shepherding in the post-Romer era of bisexual erasure in Supreme Court
litigation.84
The word “bisexual” has not appeared in a single Court opinion since
Romer, other than in a description of the language from the state constitu-
tional amendment in Romer.85 Ironically, that anti-LGBT provision itself




82. See infra Appendix. See also supra Section II.B (describing how the Court in Romer
followed the decision made by the attorneys to drop “bisexual” from the named
class).
83. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
84. See supra Section II.B.
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“Romer invalidated an amendment to
Colorado’s Constitution which named as a solitary class persons who were homosex-
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language in that case, and in the vast majority of LGBT-rights briefs and
opinions since.86
Bisexual erasure was even more blatant in the Windsor, Perry, and
Obergefell merits briefs filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of the same-
sex couples who brought those actions for marriage equality. While there
were hundreds of references to “gays,” “homosexuals,” or “gays and lesbi-
ans,” in the main party briefs filed by LGBT-rights proponents in those
cases,87 in dramatic contrast, there were a grand total of zero references to
bisexuals in the body of any of the Windsor or Perry briefs, and only one
mention of bisexuals in a single Obergefell merits brief (out of the four
filed).88 The only reference to bisexuals in the Windsor or Perry briefs by the
plaintiff-respondents seeking marriage equality in those cases was a reference
in a footnote of Edie Windsor’s brief to an expert statement regarding the
immutability of gay, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations.89 Other than
that, the Obergefell, Windsor, and Perry main party briefs failed to acknowl-
edge that bisexuals, as well as gays and lesbians, have a serious stake in the
outcome of same-sex marriage litigation: when bisexuals are in same-sex
partnerships (as they often are), they are harmed by marriage bans, just as
gays and lesbians are. Rather than acknowledge this reality, however, the
briefs consistently described same-sex life partnerships as entered into only
by gays and lesbians, not bisexuals.90
Similarly, in the lower appellate courts, there have been no references
to bisexuals in the majority opinions of any of the federal decisions af-
firming same-sex marriage rights, which mirrors the general failure to men-
tion bisexuality in those cases’ party briefings.91 It is unsurprising that, for
the most part, the opinions from the federal appellate courts have largely
mimicked the language of those briefs, never mentioning bisexuals as either
uals, lesbians, or bisexual either by ‘orientation, conduct, practices or relation-
ships’ . . . .”) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)).
86. See supra Part II.B. See also infra Appendix (detailing the disappearance of “bisexual”
from Supreme Court opinions and briefs after Romer).
87. See infra Appendix.
88. Id.
89. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-2335-
cv, 12-2435), 2012 WL 3900586, at *25 n.16 (“As for BLAG’s contentions as to the
‘fluidity’ of women’s sexuality, BLAG Br. 31, Professor Lisa Diamond, the leading
expert on women’s sexuality, who was originally cited by BLAG in opposition to Ms.
Windsor’s motion for summary judgment, definitively answered the question as fol-
lows: ‘If the question is whether gays, lesbians and bisexuals are a group of people
with a distinct, immutable characteristic, my scientific answer to that question is
yes.’ JA-964 at ¶ 10.”).
90. See infra Appendix.
91. See infra Appendix.
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litigants or affected classes within the context of same-sex marriage.92 Not
that correlation proves causation; one should not lay the blame entirely at
the feet of the attorneys in those cases for setting the tone for bisexual era-
sure. As legal scholars have noted, bi erasure has occurred not just among
attorneys, but also across the board throughout the LGBT community.93
There are many factors that go into bisexual erasure, as bi erasure
scholars have described, and as previously discussed. An additional factor
may be that there is not a single “out” [of the metaphoric closet] bisexual
jurist on the federal (or perhaps even state) bench as of the writing of this
Article.94 This complete lack of representation on the bench, along with
many of the factors identified by the bi erasure scholars, may well be a
substantial contributing factor to bi invisibility and erasure in federal court
opinions.
No matter the underlying reasons for the failure of courts to mention
bisexuals alongside lesbians and gays in past opinions, the more recent trend
is for the Supreme Court to use the more inclusive umbrella phrase “same-
sex” couple, at least in the context of marriage cases. This catch-all term
neither explicitly includes nor omits either gays or bisexuals. Because same-
sex marriage bans are not written in terms of sexual orientation but rather in
terms of the sex of those persons getting married, the phrase “same-sex mar-
riage” and corresponding reference to “same-sex couples,” is perfectly appro-
priate. At the very least, using this terminology is certainly more appropriate
and inclusive than if the Court had imposed an artificial “gay and lesbian”
descriptor to capture those entering into same-sex marriages, omitting bisex-
uals, as has too often been the case in past opinions and briefs.
In a 2014 article, Professor Ben-Asher criticizes the Windsor Court’s
use of the phrase “same-sex marriage” as a replacement for naming gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals, writing: “The Supreme Court’s historic decision in
United States v. Windsor is striking for, among other things, the conspicuous
absence of the words ‘homosexual,’ ‘lesbian,’ or ‘bisexual.’ In place of these
characters, Windsor introduces us to the new legal homosexual: the same-sex
couple.”95 This analysis misses two key points. First, “same-sex marriage” is
not just the new homosexual: it is the new homosexual and bisexual, for
both mono- and bi- sexuals enter into same-sex marriages. Second, as docu-
mented in the Appendix and chronicled on the preceding pages of this Arti-
cle, it is only the erasure of the words “homosexual” and “lesbian” from the
92. Id. A happy exception is Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Latta v. Otter, discussed infra
Section III.B.4.b.
93. See supra Section II.B.
94. See Thompson, supra note 1.
95. Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 245 (2014) (footnote omitted).
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Court’s opinions that is new; bisexuals have been erased in both opinions
and briefs since long before Windsor.
Thus, I would come to the opposite conclusion as Ben-Asher and
posit that the Court’s use of the comparatively bisexual-inclusive phrase
“same-sex couples,” rather than the bisexual-exclusive phrase “gays and les-
bians,” should be viewed as progress. With bisexuals long having been
erased from Supreme Court terminology, a more inclusive phrase that in-
cludes all persons in same-sex marriages, not just gays and lesbians, is prefer-
able to the bisexual-exclusion the Court and many LGBT-rights litigants
had been perpetuating since Romer. Thus, the use of the phrase “same-sex
marriage” arguably denotes a move toward greater inclusivity. To seal that
inclusivity, however, it would be even better if courts were to not only use
inclusive phrases such as “same-sex marriage” and “same-sex couples,” but
to also explicitly spell out that bisexuals as well as gays are detrimentally
affected by same-sex marriage bans, and thus are included within the um-
brella of “same-sex couple” terminology.  To help facilitate much-needed
progress on that front, LGBT rights lawyers should take the lead in setting
the tone for greater inclusivity in their own legal writing.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF BISEXUAL ERASURE
Having painted a more complete picture of bisexual erasure, including
the origin of the phrase and the anecdotal and statistical evidence of the
problem in a litigation context, I return now to the seminal question of why
bisexual erasure matters. Here I will examine the harms done by bisexual
erasure, including both direct harms to bisexuals and indirect harms that
flow to the broader LGBT community and that threaten the integrity of our
legal system as it confronts sexual orientation and gender issues.
A. Harms Specific to Bisexuals
Bisexuals themselves are most immediately harmed by bisexual era-
sure, although, as will be explained in the following section, bisexual erasure
is harmful to those outside the bisexual community as well. In addition to
facing the same threats as gay members of same-sex couples who are dis-
criminated against because of the gender of their partners, bisexuals face
additional threats as a result of the lack of recognition of bisexuality as a
valid sexual orientation. Statistical surveys and studies have revealed that
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bisexual youth are more likely to be bullied and threatened than gay and
lesbian youth,96 and are more likely to attempt or commit suicide.97
In the legal context, there are two specific areas of law in which bisex-
uals face particular concrete harms through lack of bisexual recognition:
immigration and family law. In addition, bisexual erasure causes a number
of serious psychic harms as well. Each of these is explored below.
1. Immigration
In the context of immigration, bisexuals may be faced with unique
hurdles, for example, potentially being required to prove they are “gay
enough” to warrant protection from persecution by their home countries.
One of the most critical dangers of immigration boards uneducated about
the valid existence of bisexuals is that if an individual seeking asylum on the
basis of sexual orientation had previously been in an opposite-sex marriage,
some officials might deem the subsequent same-sex relationship to be a
sham.  The United States has recognized persecution on the basis of sexual
orientation as a basis for asylum since 1994.98  To receive asylum on that
basis, sexual minorities who fear persecution may apply for asylum as refu-
gees under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a),(b)(1). However, these protections do not
always come easily to bisexuals, who may be viewed as being in “sham”
relationships when the validity of sexual orientation may evade the compre-
hension of the immigration officer or judge evaluating that person’s life
from the outside and making life-altering decisions about the bisexual asy-
lum-seeker.  To a bisexual seeking asylum from a country where same-sex
relationships are persecuted and LGBT people are threatened with violence
96. Mark S. Friedman, et al., A Meta-Analysis of Disparities in Childhood Sexual Abuse,
Parental Physical Abuse, and Peer Victimization Among Sexual Minority and Sexual
Nonminority Individuals, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1481, 1486-87 (Aug. 2011).
97. See Sharita Forrest, Bisexual Teens at Highest Risk of Bullying, Truancy, Suicide, U. ILL.
NEWS BUREAU, (Oct. 13, 2011), http://news.illinois.edu/news/11/1013teens_Doro
thyEspelage_JosephRobinson.html (“A little more than 7 percent of straight youth
reported thinking about suicide during the prior 30 days, versus 33 percent of
LGBTQ students. Bisexual youth were at especially high risk (44 percent), as were
questioning youth (32 percent). Bisexual youth also were at elevated risk of suicide
attempts, with more than 21 percent reporting that they had made at least one
attempt during the prior year. Nearly twice as many LGBTQ students as straight
students – 39 percent versus 20 percent – reported having been bullied, threatened
or harassed over the Internet. Again, bisexual youth reported the highest levels of
victimization – 49 percent – among sexual minority youth.”).
98. See Applying for Asylum, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, http://www.immigrationequal-
ity.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/asylum/applying-for-asylum/; see also 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2013)(establishing asylum eligibility).
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or even killed, an asylum board’s decisions takes on life-or-death
significance.
This is not merely a hypothetical scenario. By way of example, three
cases in particular highlight the egregious harms bisexual erasure can cause
in an immigration context. First, in Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, the immigra-
tion board rejected a man’s marriage as a sham marriage after asking “an
inordinate number of questions concerning [his] homosexuality” and found
that because of his past homosexual inclinations, his opposite-sex marriage
must be a sham.99 The immigration board never addressed the possibility
that the man was bisexual.100
A second, related case is currently pending in the United Kingdom.
In the case of Orashia Edwards, a bisexual man seeking to emigrate from
Jamaica (where same-sex relationships are illegal) to the United Kingdom,
Edwards was originally denied asylum due to a finding of “dishonest sexual-
ity,” because the British Home Office did not view as valid his two-year
relationship with another man, in light of the fact he had previously been
married to a woman.101  In a move reflecting degrading desperation, Ed-
wards, who fears being killed for his same-sex relationship if he is sent back
to Jamaica, took the drastic step of sending photos of himself having sex
with his male partner to the British Home Office, as a last resort in trying to
prove his bisexuality is not dishonest sexuality, but is in fact his true sexual
orientation.102
A third example of the dangers caused by bisexual erasure in an immi-
gration context is a case arising out of the United States.  In the pending
case of Ivo Widlak, a Polish journalist who has been married to his wife for
over twelve years, Widlak, since coming out as bisexual, has been threatened
with deportation after being accused of being in a sham marriage.103 His
case illustrates the dangers faced by immigrants who are accused of being in
99. Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. See Garcia-Jaramillo, 604 F.2d 1236.
101. Thom Senzee, Bisexual Seeking Asylum Resorts to Photos When Asked to Prove It, AD-
VOCATE.COM (May 11, 2015), http://www.advocate.com/world/2015/05/10/bisex-
ual-asylum-seeker-humiliated-trying-prove-sexuality-uk-officials-0. See also Joe
Morgan, Mother of Bisexual Asylum Seeker Will Sue Britain if They Send Her Son
Home to Die, GAY STAR NEWS (April 24, 2015), http://www.gaystarnews.com/arti-
cle/mother-bisexual-asylum-seeker-will-sue-britain-if-they-send-her-son-home-
die240415/ (citing Edwards’ mother and partner who believe Jamaica is not a safe
place for Edwards after his deportation battle in England).
102. Senzee, supra note 101.
103. See Popular Chicago Journalist Facing Deportation, CHICAGOLAND RADIO AND ME-
DIA, Sept. 26, 2013, http://chicagoradioandmedia.com/news/5980-popular-chicago-
journalist-facing-deportation; see also Faith Cheltenham, The Curious Case of Ivo
Widlak, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/faith-
cheltenham/the-curious-case-of-ivo-widlak_b_2317756.html.
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sham same-sex partnerships when one’s past opposite-sex partnerships or
bisexual identification is discovered.
These dangers are particularly acute in the cases of bisexual immi-
grants seeking asylum who risk being sent back to a country where non-
heterosexual conduct is a crime for which they may be severely punished. In
this context, therefore, bisexual erasure has the gravest of repercussions, put-
ting bisexuals’ lives in peril if they are denied asylum based on a failure to
understand their bisexual orientation, as in the aforementioned case of
Orashia Edwards.
2. Custody and Adoption
In an area of law rife with opportunity for subjective bias, family law
can be particularly harsh on bisexuals. Some scholars have addressed the
hurdles faced by LGBT individuals in custody and adoption cases,104 with
gays at times discriminated against when they are deemed to be a moral
threat to children.105 Bisexuals face the same risk of discriminatory treat-
ment in family court and then some; as explained below, bisexuals are even
more likely to be adjudged unstable, and, consequently, unfit parents, due
to their sexual orientation.
As a preliminary matter, opinions from courts in adoption and cus-
tody cases tend to describe formerly married persons in same-sex relation-
ships as “gay” or “homosexual,” rather than acknowledging bisexuality as a
valid sexual orientation (perpetuating Yoshino’s second and third form of
bisexual erasure), as described below.
When bisexuality is acknowledged, courts are often inclined to view
the difference as an even greater indicia of emotional or moral danger to
children. To wit, courts faced with bisexual parents in custody and adoption
petition cases have, in some cases, appeared to view bisexuality as a form of
emotional instability that casts into doubt the healthy parenting abilities of
the bisexual individual seeking custody or adoption.
For example, an appellate court in Arizona, reviewing a lower court’s
decision to deny a bisexual man’s adoption petition, stated:
104. See Mark Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting,
Adoption, and the Best Interest of the Child, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 49 (1996) (address-
ing hurdles lesbians, gays, and bisexuals face in adoption).
105. Morality is often mentioned in cases denying custody to homosexuals and bisexuals
both. One example is the decision of a trial court reversed on appeal to deny custody
on moral grounds to a woman on the basis of her “admitted bisexuality and involve-
ment in lesbian relationships,” Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
2015] B R I D G I N G  B I S E X U A L  E R A S U R E 319
The amicus brief centers its argument on the self-presumed fact
that the trial court based its decision solely on appellant’s sexual
orientation. The dissent also maintains that appellant’s bisexual-
ity was the sole reason for the denial of his petition to be certi-
fied as acceptable to adopt children. We disagree. As we have
stated, we find ample evidence to support the trial court without
examining that issue.
However, we believe appellant’s ambivalence in his sexual prefer-
ence was very appropriately a concern of the court. As we have
stated previously, the primary concern of the court, to the exclu-
sion of all else, is the best interest and welfare of any child. Cer-
tainly the sexual orientation of one who petitions to be certified
as acceptable to adopt a child is a factor to be reviewed and
evaluated by the court.106
In a more recent decision, a reviewing Mississippi court held:
[I]n addition to the mother’s bisexual lifestyle, the chancellor
was disturbed at the mother’s lack of financial and emotional
stability. He was extremely concerned that the mother quit a
well-paying full time job to move to Gulfport to start a business.
The chancellor was most impressed with the father’s ability to
provide a stable environment for his daughter in the form of an
established home in which she would have her own bedroom
and would be living in a traditional family environment. As in
Weigand and Thompson, although the morality of the mother’s
lifestyle was one important factor to the chancellor’s decision, it
was not the sole factor; thus, there was no clear error and the
chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding custody to
the father.107
Courts in other cases, while not using the word “bisexual” to reference a
parent who has dated both men and women, nonetheless appear to view
such bisexual dating as evidence of instability. An Alabama court, for exam-
ple, reversed a lower court’s custody ruling and instead denied custody to a
mother after extensively citing a guardian ad litem’s detailed report with the
following passage:
106. In re The Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 834 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added).
107. S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 661 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
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[T]he [mother] lacks stability; that she has admitted driving with
the minor child after consuming alcoholic beverages; that she has
admitted not using proper child restraints while transporting the
minor child; that she has been diagnosed with situational depres-
sion and thereafter failed or refused to take her prescribed medi-
cation; that she threatened to leave the State with the minor
child; that she engaged in a lesbian relationship while the minor
children were in close vicinity; that she slapped her stepdaughter;
that she has written bad checks; that she lied to the Court re-
garding the loss of her job; that she had sexual relations with a
man prior to obtaining a divorce from the [father]; and she failed
to obtain counselling after the same was recommended to her by
a psychiatrist.108
Courts at times also view bisexuals as being more able to choose to
comply with a judicial demand to give up their same-sex partners for the
sake of their children.109
Other comparable cases never make it into written opinions or the
scholarship addressing “lesbian and gay” custody issues, with bisexuality
often omitted in the legal analysis of custody cases.110 However, in my years
of work with the LGBT community, I have encountered a number of par-
ents who recount courts viewing with suspicion the perceived fluctuating
“lifestyle” choices of a parent who goes from an opposite-sex marriage to a
same-sex relationship.  Furthermore, the common pejorative presumption
that bisexuals are more promiscuous than monosexuals may also feed into
such biases against bisexuality by courts deciding custody and adoption
issues.111
The delegitimization of bisexuals by depicting them as less stable than
monosexuals is a form of Yoshino’s third type of bisexual erasure. Such
delegitimization harms not just parents who identify as bisexual, but also
those who have gone from being in opposite-sex relationships to identifying
as gay. Courts do not seem to take into account how such parents identify;
in the above examples, for instance, bisexuality is not mentioned by the
courts. Rather, it is the conduct of having gone from an opposite-sex to a
same-sex relationship that is punished. Thus, all members of the LGBT
108. Dorn v. Dorn, 724 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. App. 1998) (citing Corl v. Corl, 560 So.
2d 774 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)) (emphasis added).
109. See COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 26, at 39.
110. See, e.g., Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Chil-
dren, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 95 (2002)(discussing non-heterosexual cus-
tody cases almost exclusively in terms of gays and lesbians, not bisexuals).
111. See Yoshino, supra note 27 (addressing deligitimization of bisexuals as promiscuous).
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community, especially those who do not identify as bisexual but were once
in opposite- sex relationships, would do well to open their eyes to the harm-
ful nature of custody decisions based on negative stereotypes about
bisexuals.
3. Unique Intangible Harms
There are other intangible harms that result from bisexual erasure. In
marriage equality cases and otherwise, the erasure of bisexuals imposes a
variety of stigmatizing harms, rendering them second-class in status.
The relegation of bisexuals to an invisible status not worthy of a single
mention in Obergefell’s affirmation of same-sex marriage rights is especially
troubling. In particular, the Supreme Court’s declaration in Obergefell that
“[i]t demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central
institution of the Nation’s society,”112 is infuriatingly ironic: just as it de-
means gays and lesbians to be excluded from an important institution in
society, it demeans bisexuals to be excluded from the Court’s recognition of
that very point.  The irony of bisexual exclusion in cases affirming lesbian
and gay rights, in other words, is that such relegation to second-class status
is precisely the type of stigmatizing harm that has been deemed unconscion-
able when directed toward members of same-sex unions generally. For ex-
ample, even before the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsberg decried the
second-class status imposed on same-sex couples to whom only limited mar-
riage rights are offered, describing the less-than-full marriage recognition for
same-sex couples as “skim milk marriage.”113
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Obergefell, Windsor, Lawrence, and
Romer have in various ways affirmed that singling out LGBT individuals as
second-class citizens violates the principle that separate is never equal.  The
cases affirm that unequal treatment based on one’s identity is constitution-
ally suspect for the deep dignitary harms it imposes on psychic and emo-
tional levels.114 Most strikingly, Justice Kennedy, writing for the court in
Lawrence, explained that substantive due process protections include protec-
tions for “ ‘the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,’ ” as well as “the
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee
112. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
113. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (No. 12-307).
114. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597-98, 2604, 2606; United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-96 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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of liberty.”115 With Obergefell and Windsor extending this principle to the
context of same-sex marriage recognition,116 it is deeply ironic that in doing
so without any reference to bisexuals, the Court has, while elevating gays
and lesbians to more of an equal status, simultaneously relegated bisexuals
to a lesser status.
Part of the harm to bisexuals when they are subsumed under a “lesbian
and gay” label results from the presumption that bisexuality is synonymous
with gay, and the assumption that LGBT individuals will favor those of the
same sex in choosing life partners.  That failure to honor the different life
circumstances of many bisexuals indirectly deprives them of their full ability
to be autonomous and self-defining in their most intimate life choices.117
While bisexuals are harmed by their erasure in LGBT-rights litigation,
they were also harmed in unique ways by same-sex marriage bans, which
makes their erasure from same-sex marriage litigation even less palatable.
Not only did bisexuals who were in same-sex partnerships face the same
harms as gays when they were denied equal access to marriage rights, but
they faced additional harms from marriage inequality.  As Yoshino ex-
plained, the cross-sex requirement of laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
presented a harm specific to those bisexuals who identify as being “sex-
blind” (i.e., falling in love based primarily on traits other than biological
sex): “This harm is that the state is contributing to sex-consciousness in
society by distinguishing in this way between men and women. For the sex-
blind bisexual [as opposed to for gays and straights], this consciousness is in
itself a harm, because it impedes her from seeing ‘through’ sex to other traits
that she may find more important.”118
Michael Boucai described another unique harm bisexuals suffered
under same-sex marriage bans: opposite-sex-only marriage restrictions im-
posed on them what amounted to an unnatural and coercive imposition of
an unfair choice between their full sexual liberty and the thousands of bene-
115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). See also Boucai, supra note 12, at 426-38
(arguing that the principles of Lawrence and Casey are undermined when same-sex
marriage bans impose coercive force on bisexuals in violation of their individual
autonomy and liberty).
116. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“This places same-sex
couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentia-
tion demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects,
and whose relationship the State sought to dignify.” (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558)).
117. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (describing due process liberty protections for “the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy”).
118. Yoshino, supra note 27, at 459.
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fits and rights that go along with marriage.119 As Boucai explained, “[i]t is
precisely because a bisexual possesses the ‘meaningful alternative’ denied an
exclusive homosexual – because she can marry someone of a sex she desires
– that her prerogatives are so readily and understandably manipulated by
marriage’s enormous prestige and benefits.”120 In other words, “it is in the
lives of bisexuals, whose desires and dispositions are not categorically limited
by sex, that the traditional definition of marriage is best poised, as Lawrence
puts it, to ‘control their destiny.’ ”121
Such a coerced choice, he analogized, should be deemed as invalid as
forcing a Sabbatical religious observer to choose between her religion and
her right to work (or to receive unemployment compensation benefits), as
the Court recognized in Sherbert v. Verner, in which the Arkansas Supreme
Court recently recognized was analogous to same-sex adoption bans.122
Boucai offered that the same rationale could be extended to successfully
challenge same-sex marriage bans, particularly by reference to the bisexual,
who has even more of a choice than the homosexual as to whether to marry
someone of the opposite sex.123
But LGBT-rights briefs in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell
ultimately did not contain such an argument, or even, as detailed herein,
almost any reference to bisexuals at all.124 This absence of bisexuality from
the arguments and analyses in opinions and briefs in LGBT-rights cases,
despite the ways in which the inclusion of bisexuality could actually
strengthen LGBT-rights arguments, is deplorable.  Bisexual erasure in
LGBT-rights litigation sends the harmful message that bisexuals do not ex-
ist, or, that if we do, we may not be equally entitled to protections accorded
to other sexual orientations. There are not sufficient words suitable for a law
review article to describe the psychic injury of being left out time and time
again despite having put in decades of work fighting for the rights of the
larger LGBT community. The slights and wounds, however, are real, and
119. See Boucai, supra note 12, at 416-18, 431-32. This argument should not be confused
with an assertion that bisexuals can choose to be bisexual in the first place, or can
choose with whom to fall in love. Rather, Boucai describes the choice to marry;
comparisons are drawn to smaller decisions, such as whether to place an ad in the
“seeking men,” “seeking women,” or “seeking both” section of a personal ad website.
See Yoshino, supra note 27, at 443. Bisexuals may (and in my case, I can attest do)
feel as if they have more of a choice as to which communities or genders upon which
to focus our dating (and ultimately, marital, for those of us so inclined) energies.
120. Boucai, supra note 12, at 417 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
122. Id. at 431-32 (discussing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) and the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s discussion of Sherbert in Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2011)).
123. Id. at 417, 431-32.
124. See infra Appendix.
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should not be dismissed as insignificant, any more than gays and lesbians
would wish courts to dismiss as insignificant the wounds of being left out of
the equal dignity and liberty protections afforded by full marriage
recognition.
To the extent that courts may be merely mirroring the language of
LGBT-rights attorneys, who for strategic reasons may decide to exclude spe-
cific references to bisexuality or bisexuals, it is understandable that courts
will follow the cues of the advocates who brief the issues to them. LGBT-
rights advocates who persist in omitting all mention of bisexuals from their
briefings, in contrast, know better and have more of a responsibility to re-
present all the members of the LGBT community affected by their impact
litigation. While LGBT-rights advocates may think they are making a
stronger or cleaner case by omitting a large portion of affected persons from
the dialogue, the longer they continue to make the mistake of leaving bisex-
uals out of LGBT-rights analyses and argument, the harder it will be to
repair the resulting harms down the road.
B. Broader Harms
In addition to harms specific to bisexuals, bisexual erasure in LGBT
litigation also has negative repercussions for the rest of the LGBT commu-
nity, for members of the bar and bench in their work on related issues, and
arguably for society as a whole. Bisexual erasure in litigation can result in
missed opportunities for refining legal dialogues and strengthening legal
protections for equal liberty and justice in a more doctrinally integrated,
cross-cultural, and cohesive manner. Furthermore, advocates for LGBT
rights undercut their own arguments for equal dignity when they fail to
accord such dignity to the bisexuals within their own community by relegat-
ing them to second-class status or utter invisibility in their legal arguments.
There are many other harms caused by bisexual erasure, not just to bisexu-
als, but to other members of the LGBT community, and to a justice system
that prides itself on prizing truth and equity.
1. Statistical Inaccuracies
As set forth earlier, recent surveys estimate bisexuals at 43% to 52% of
the LGBT population.125 The misleading inferences to the contrary, omit-
ting bisexuals from LGBT-rights discourse as statistically irrelevant—when
in fact bisexuals comprise nearly half of the LGBT population—simply does
not reflect reality. Courts are in the business of discerning truth and being
factually accurate in their analyses.  A legal system that emphasizes the im-
125. See supra Part I.A.
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portance of veracity should not perpetuate the reckless promotion of statisti-
cal inaccuracies. It is shamefully inaccurate for court opinions, especially
when following the lead of our own advocates, to address the rights of those
in romantic same-sex partnerships in terms of “gay” or “gay and lesbian”
rights only, leaving out a substantial segment of the LGBT population.
To be accurate, discussions of disenfranchised LGBT individuals who
are discriminated against due to their sexual orientation or gender identity
should include references to bisexuals and transgender individuals, and not
just to gays and lesbians. In the same vein, analyses confined to the subject
of sexual orientation should take into account that “gay” and “straight” are
not the only possible sexual orientations. Bisexuals not only exist, we exist in
substantial numbers. By failing to acknowledge both our existence and the
reality that bisexuals too are harmed by sexual orientation discrimination,
the courts become complicit in perpetuating misleading myths.
2. Perpetuation of False Dichotomies and Isolationist Paradigm
In a passage quoted by several bisexual erasure legal scholars, Alfred
Kinsey and his co-authors, in describing the fluid, rather than dichotomous,
nature of sexual orientation, famously wrote:
The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all
things are black nor all things white. It is a fundamental of tax-
onomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the
human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into sepa-
rated pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and
every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this concerning
human sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound under-
standing of the realities of sex.126
What may have been obvious to Kinsey after his extensive studies of
human sexuality, and what may seem clear to those who are bisexual, is not
as intuitive for those who cling to simplistically dichotomous categorizations
of sexual orientation. Unfortunately, this inaccurate portrayal of sexual ori-
entation as a simple “gay or straight” binary has negative repercussions far
beyond the slight to bisexuals who are left out. Additionally, the simplistic
framing of complex issues of gender as well as sexual orientation in such
black-and-white dichotomous terms not only fails to capture the reality of
the lives of bisexuals and transgender individuals, whose more nuanced and
126. ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (1948); Glazer, supra note 43, at 1041; Mezey, supra
note 13, at 103-04; Yoshino, supra note 27, at 356 n.5.
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fluid gender and sexual realities threaten some binary-identified members of
society, but also lends itself to disingenuous legal analysis by courts and
advocates.
Professor Colker, the first to apply Kinsey’s critique of artificial binary
categorizations to the context of bisexual jurisprudence, did so in the con-
text of advocating for the embrace of a bisexual perspective as a more holis-
tic approach to understanding sexuality.127  Colker describes “the categories
of heterosexual and homosexual as inventions that do a disservice to the
realities of [bisexuals’] lives, feelings, and relationships.”128 She offers that
“[t]he term bisexual may . . . often be an accurate way to describe the com-
plex ways that people live their lives, not conforming to the rigid bipolar
categories of heterosexual and homosexual,” and advocates an “embodied
bisexual perspective” as a way to define “sexual orientation in such a non-
static, fluid way [that] would deeply challenge sexual dualities and the defin-
ing of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people as purely sexual.”129
Professor Glazer’s bisexual jurisprudence article, while advocating a
different definitional system, echoes Colker’s critique of the binary. She
similarly writes that, just as transgender individuals “challenge the pervasive
gender binary” that functions as a normative foundation in our communi-
ties and legal system, bisexuals similarly “challenge the pervasive sexual-ori-
entation binary that ‘contemporary American society . . . insist[s] on.’ ”130
To the extent that both groups fall outside the norm by failing to “adhere
strictly to a binary,”131 Glazer suggests that the use of binary models to
alienate both transgender and bisexual individuals has resulted in them be-
coming minorities within minorities, victimized by society’s desire to dictate
normalcy through dichotomies.132
In Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Iden-
tity Classification Based on Acts,133 Naomi Mezey similarly writes of the need
to challenge limiting dichotomies in legal discourse. Mezey suggests that it
is important to move from rigid dichotomous hetero/homo identity-based
classifications to a more fluid approach to sexual politics and laws. She ar-
gues that the gay and lesbian rights movement would do well to include
bridges to its allies, to pragmatically “craft a reformulated vision of sexual
identity that is both socially feasible and politically viable, one that allows us
127. Colker, Embodied Bisexual Perspective, supra note 26 at 174-175.
128. Id. at 174.
129. Id. at 174-75.
130. Glazer, supra note 43, at 1017 (quoting Yoshino, supra note 14, at 356 (footnotes
omitted)).
131. Id. at 1017.
132. Id.
133. Mezey, supra note 13.
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to forge unprecedented and potentially powerful alliances.”134 In proposing
that a broader, more inclusive approach to sexual politics could allow for a
strategically necessary bridge between gays and their allies, Mezey suggests
that bisexuals (including those who have either identified as bisexual or
whose conduct might render them somewhere in the middle range of the
Kinsey scale)135 could become that bridge.
There are other bridges to cross as well: the omission of bisexuality in
LGBT discussion is indicative of an intersectional and related failure to fully
include the realities of many people of color. As Colker argues, the bisexual
perspective adds important holistic dimensions to discussions of law and
morality. She points out that bisexual inclusivity leads to more comprehen-
sive cross-sectionality with race in particular, as there is a significantly high
percentage of people of color who identify as bisexual or engage in bisexual
behavior.136
As Colker notes, the problem with an oppressed group discriminating
against its own, even subtly, through non-inclusion, was illustrated in Audre
Lorde’s book This Bridge Called My Back.137 Lorde’s writings poignantly call
out the feminist movement for often neglecting the voice of women of color
in its cries for equality and justice.138 In a similar manner, while bisexuals
can truly serve as a bridge between heterosexuals and homosexuals, it would
be a perpetuation rather than an alleviation of injustice for the LGBT move-
ment to treat the bi bridge with no more respect than the metaphoric
“bridge called my back” of Audre Lorde, ignoring or even exploiting the
bridge-building offerings of communities that could help build constructive
intersectionality.
In her own book on bridge building (from a bisexual perspective),
Colker explains that the dangers of rigid binary constructs of sexual orienta-
tion mirror the false binaries that keep multiracial individuals from being
134. Id. at 133.
135. See id. at 103-07 (describing studies of Alfred Kinsey, whose comprehensive and
highly respected work on sexuality has established, along with others’ studies, that a
large percentage of both men and women are not exclusively homosexual or hetero-
sexual, but rather fall in between a 0 and a 6 on a seven-point scale of sexual orienta-
tion, once their same-sex sexual experiences are taken into account).
136. See Colker, Embodied Bisexual Perspective, supra note 26, at 175-76 (citing John L.
Peterson, Black Men and Their Same-Sex Desires and Behaviors, in GAY CULTURE IN
AMERICA: ESSAYS FROM THE FIELD 147, 148 (Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1992)). See also
COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 26, at 17-18, 26-36.
137. Colker, Embodied Bisexual Perspective, supra note 26, at 167-68 (citing letter from
Audre Lorde, civil rights activist, to Mary Daly, feminist philosopher, in A BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 94-97 (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981)).
138. Id.
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recognized as having valid identities.139 In both categories, she writes, bisex-
uality can help illuminate the possibilities and “implications of living be-
tween categories,”140 and in the context of race in particular, “[a] bi
perspective may . . . enhance our understanding of race by encouraging us
to make an intracategorical investigation of racial categories.”141 With mem-
bers of these groups denied full recognition by law and society, they simi-
larly embody the limitations of binary identity constructs and the
contrasting freedom that fluidity can offer, whether in the context of race,
sexual orientation, or beyond.
Bringing these issues back to the context of LGBT-rights litigation,
this intersectionality of race and sexual orientation is further illustrated in
the Apilado v. North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance case, brought
by the National Center for Lesbian Rights.  In that case, described in more
detail in Part IV of this Article, not only were the plaintiffs all bisexual men,
but they were also men of color, resulting in a claim of race discrimination
included among the complaint allegations in the Gay Softball World Series
lawsuit.142
For all these reasons, bisexuals, along with transgender individuals and
people of color, can help illuminate the limitations of binary isolationist
models, and can offer a more holistic and cross-cultural model for under-
standing and addressing identity.
3. Undermining Equal Liberty Arguments
As previously discussed, the relegation of bisexuals to a subsumed exis-
tence secondary to the primary identities of gays and heterosexuals conflicts
with the equal liberty and dignity-focused themes and arguments being
made in LGBT-rights cases. The Supreme Court in Romer, Lawrence, and
Windsor helped establish a solid platform upon which LGBT individuals
may ground further equal dignity-based arguments, admonishing against
making any disfavored group of persons second-class citizens under the
law.143 Thus, the second-class status imposed through bisexual erasure vio-
lates the very principles of equal respect, autonomy, and dignity that LGBT
litigants have sought to protect through constitutional litigation.
The resulting harms to bisexuals have already been addressed, but here
it is worth mentioning that the inconsistency of arguments made by LGBT-
139. COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 26, at 36-38.
140. Id. at 36.
141. Id. at 38.
142. Complaint at 37-39, 52, Apilado v. North Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Challenge,
792 F.Supp.2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00682).
143. See supra Section III.A.3.
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rights advocates who fight for equal dignity even while engaging in bi era-
sure is counterproductive, ultimately undermining their own cause. To argue
that gays and lesbians are entitled to equal liberty and dignity on one hand,
but to simultaneously deny that same recognition to bisexuals on the other,
harms not just bisexuals, but also those LGBT-rights advocates whose argu-
ments may thereby be weakened by such apparent hypocrisy.
Conversely, it would only strengthen the arguments of LGBT-rights
advocates to include bisexuals as fully acknowledged members of the class
affected by same-sex marriage bans. To do so would improve the cohesive-
ness of the overall constitutional claims by LGBT-rights litigants and their
advocates.
4. Other Missed Opportunities in Refining Gender Law
and Heightened Scrutiny Analyses
The jurisprudential utility of bisexual inclusivity is not just in the po-
tential for overcoming fallacious arguments and false dichotomies, but also
in illustrating other interrelated points of legal doctrine. In particular, bisex-
uality helps illuminate some of the absurdities and complexities of gender
law.
In particular, bisexuals, along with transgender individuals, can help
illustrate the harmful role that false gender and sexual orientation dichoto-
mies can play when those dichotomies become rigidly infused into judicial
doctrine. Bisexuals can also help establish that sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is, in fact, a form of gender discrimination, which could benefit all
LGBT individuals who are presenting challenges to courts that might war-
rant heightened scrutiny. Each of these points is discussed in more detail
below.
a. Beyond Rigid Gender Binaries: Title VII and Bisexual
and Transgender Employees
Sex discrimination jurisprudence has, at times, tied itself into knots
through judicial efforts to establish binary sex and gender definitions, even
when human beings do not smoothly sort themselves into black-and-white
sex and gender categories, as the law would have them do.144 The trans-
gender dialectic can help illustrate the absurdity of such artificial sex and
gender constructs within the law.  Similarly, bisexuals can help bridge the
gap between binary boxes and illustrate why rigid dichotomous constructs
144. For a comprehensive exposition of this issue, see generally M. Dru Levasseur, Gender
Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to
Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943 (2015).
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of sex and gender by the courts are unworkable, and also why they are
unnecessary.  Some examples follow.
One commonly noted, absurd result of bisexual invisibility (although
bi erasure is not as commonly cited as the source of the problem) is an
oddity in sexual harassment law: the problem of the “equal opportunity
harasser.”145 This absurdity is an accidental sexual harassment loophole
under which bisexual employers in some jurisdictions may find themselves
able to evade liability if they sexually harass both men and women, because
they are then not viewed by some courts as having discriminated against
someone “because of sex,” as required for Title VII liability.146 As the D.C.
Circuit Court noted in one case, this “equal opportunity harasser” problem
could exist where, “[i]n the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would
apply to male and female employees alike.”147 The Seventh Circuit has simi-
larly accepted a type of harasser immunity defense, writing that it is not
“anomalous for a Title VII remedy to be precluded when both sexes are
treated badly. Title VII is predicated on discrimination. Given this premise,
requiring disparate treatment is consistent with the statute’s purpose of
preventing such treatment.”148
So long as sex and gender are rigidly circumscribed by a Title VII
jurisprudence that requires that either women or men (but never both) be a
target of harassment for that harassment to be deemed “because of sex,”149
such an “either/or” dichotomous construct will eventually hit a logical wall,
even if the logical conundrum posed by the binary category-defying equal
opportunity bisexual harasser is a rare case.
The liability loophole, or favored status, for bisexuals under Title VII
may be an illusory one, however. As Colker describes, “[t]he doctrine is
actually a joke,” with most courts being  disinclined to believe that bisexuals
exist, or doubtful that bisexuals would avail themselves of the doctrine,
where doing so would require defending themselves through the confession
of additional sexual harassment.150 Thus, the doctrine is a tease, but not one
without harms, for “[t]he doctrine sends the message that bisexuals would
be the most inappropriate individuals to hire as supervisors, because they
can harass workers with impunity,” perpetuating negative stereotypes about
145. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2000).
146. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (West, Westlaw through
2015 legislation).
147. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
148. Holman, 211 F.3d at 404 (second emphasis added).
149. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (West, Westlaw through
2015 legislation).
150. Colker, supra note 10, at 136.
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bisexuals and giving employers additional excuses not to hire bisexuals.151
Furthermore, as Colker points out, the loophole does not provide bisexuals
legal protection in any holistic sense, because “men and women can receive
legal protection when they are harassed by a same-sex harasser supervisor
but cannot get legal protection under Title VII if they are fired for being gay
or lesbian [or bisexual].”152
While perhaps not a viable defense, the bisexual equal opportunity
immunity loophole nonetheless serves as an important illustration of the
limitations of gender dichotomies in jurisprudence. Indeed, in Title VII
law, both bisexual and transgender members of the LGBT community play
important, though different roles, in highlighting how gender discrimina-
tion and LGBT discrimination are intertwined.  While, in the case of sexual
harassment, bisexuals help illustrate how discrimination “because of sex”
may take on different meanings when more fluid views of sexual orientation
are considered, transgender-rights attorneys have been successful in demon-
strating in Title VII cases that sex discrimination may also take varied
forms, particularly when transgender and other gender fluidity factors are at
play.  This success became dramatically evident in a historic moment in
LGBT history in which transgender rights successes paved the path for
others: on April 20, 2012, the EEOC issued a ruling explicitly affirming
protections against employment discrimination for transgender employees
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.153
In the landmark EEOC ruling, Macy v. Holder, the plaintiff was a
police detective who was denied a job with the ATF after she revealed dur-
ing the background check portion of the job interview that she was trans-
gender and transitioning from male to female.154 The EEOC granted
Macy’s gender discrimination claim, following past federal cases that recog-
nized Title VII claims on the basis of gender identity stereotyping, including
the Supreme Court Price Waterhouse decision.155 The EEOC explicitly af-
firmed that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, rul-
ing that Title VII’s protections are far-reaching “in part because the term
‘gender’ encompasses not only a person’s biological sex but also the cultural
and social aspects associated with masculinity and femininity.”156 Then, on
December 18, 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a Memorandum
announcing that the Department of Justice will henceforth recognize that
151. Id.
152. Id. at 135.
153. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012).
154. Id. at 1-2.
155. Id. at 6; see also, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
156. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 at 7.
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Title VII protections against gender discrimination include claims of dis-
crimination based on an individual’s transgender status.157
These developments are historical watershed moments, establishing
that which has long been recognized by both bisexuals and transgender
members of the LGBT community but is foreign territory for many others:
the reality that gender is a much broader construct than a black and white
dichotomous understanding of biological sex. Consequently, gender dis-
crimination takes many forms, as do its victims, which the law is increas-
ingly beginning to recognize.
More recently, it has become apparent that the Macy decision opened
the door not just to transgender protections under Title VII, but to greater
protections for other LGBT individuals as well, under a broader approach
now taken by the EEOC in bringing discrimination claims under federal
law. To wit, the EEOC has already brought 1,200 such claims since
2013,158 although some courts are more resistant than others to extend gen-
der discrimination protections to LGBT individuals.159 Ironically, the New
York Times reports that this new trend of EEOC claims brought against
sexual orientation discrimination have been brought for “lesbians, gays and
transgender” people; at least from this report, it appears that bisexuals con-
tinue to be left out of this effort, revealing yet another incident of bisexual
erasure (if only in the reporting of the development by the Times).160
b. Illuminating Sexual Orientation Discrimination as
a Form of Gender Discrimination
Title VII is not the only context in which both transgender and bisex-
ual individuals have transcended rigid gender dichotomies and helped estab-
157. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to United States Attorneys
Heads of Department Components, Treatment of Transgender Employment Dis-
crimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-
gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination.
158. Miles Bryan, For People Fired for Being Gay, Old Court Case Becomes a New Tool,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 10, 2014), http://npr.org/2014/11/10/363049315/for-
people-fired-for-being-gay-old-court-case-becomes-a-new-tool.
159. See, e.g., Eure v. Sage Corp., 61 F.Supp.3d 651, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“[A]lthough
Price Waterhouse provides a vehicle for transgender persons to seek recovery under
Title VII, neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit have held that discrimi-
nation based on transgender status is per se gender stereotyping actionable under
Title VII.”).
160. See Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2015, at A1 (The EEOC “has determined that discrimination against gay
men, lesbians and transgender people amounts to illegal sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and it is bringing or endorsing lawsuits under that
provision.”).
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lish sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex or gender
discrimination. In a constitutional law context, bisexuals can serve as a
bridge by illustrating the links between sexual orientation and gender,
thereby helping gays and lesbians better understand and frame their oppres-
sion as a form of gender discrimination, which would entitle them to
heightened scrutiny in constitutional challenges.161  In the marriage equality
context in particular, bisexuals can help illustrate that sexual orientation is
indeed a form of gender discrimination in the following manner, as I previ-
ously set forth in the footnote to an article:
One of the clearest illustrations of why the denial of marriage
equality is a form of sex discrimination is this: if I were to apply
for a marriage license in [a] state [that] prohibits same-sex mar-
riage, and if, in the process, I announced to the clerk issuing
marriage licenses that I am bisexual and want to marry a man,
my state would allow me to do so. If, on the other hand, I were
to approach the clerk with the statement that I am bisexual and
want to marry a woman, I would be refused a marriage license.
The only thing that would have changed is the sex of the person
I want to marry, and not my sexual orientation, which was bi-
sexual all along. Thus, the denial of marriage equality for same-
sex couples is a form of sex discrimination, based on the sex of
those in the partnership, and not, necessarily, on sexual orienta-
tion. It is my hope that the Court will engage in an analysis of
this issue in a future decision.162
In October of 2014, a federal judge for the first time—albeit in a
concurrence—explicitly acknowledged that in such a scenario, it is indeed
the case that a same-sex marriage ban was a form of sex discrimination,
writing:
[S]ame-sex marriage prohibitions, if anything, classify more ob-
viously on the basis of sex than they do on the basis of sexual
161. See Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”:
The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17,
59 n. 54 (2014); Toby Adams, “Bisexual Marriage”: A Sex Discrimination Argument
for Heightened Scrutiny of Same-Sex Marriage Bans (2011) (unpublished student
paper available at http://tobyshome.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/bisexual-marriage
.pdf). See also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (generally discussing sex-
ual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination).
162. Marcus, supra note 161, at 31 n.54.
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orientation. . . The statutes’ gender focus is also borne out by the
experience of one of the Nevada plaintiff couples:
When Karen Goody and Karen Vibe went to the Washoe
County Marriage Bureau to obtain a marriage license, the
security officer asked, “Do you have a man with you?”
When Karen Vibe said they did not, and explained that she
wished to marry Karen Goody, she was told she could not
even obtain or complete a marriage license applica-
tion . . . [because] “[t]wo women can’t apply” . . . [and]
marriage is “between a man and a woman.”
Notably, Goody and Vibe were not asked about their sexual ori-
entation; Vibe was told she was being excluded because of her
gender and the gender of her partner.
Of course, the reason Vibe wants to marry Goody, one
presumes, is due in part to their sexual orientations. But
that does not mean the classification at issue is not sex-
based. . . . [A] statute that imposes a sex qualification,
whether for a marriage license or a job application, is sex
discrimination, pure and simple, even where assumptions
about sexual orientation are also at play.163
Even more critical for purposes of bisexual jurisprudence, Judge
Berzon’s Latta v. Otter concurrence represented, for the first time in a fed-
eral opinion,164 that bisexuals in same-sex partnerships were recognized as
also being victims of marriage bans, explaining:
The need for such a presumption, as to a factor that does not
appear on the face of the same-sex marriage bans, suggests that
the gender discrimination analysis is, if anything, a closer fit to
the problem before us than the sexual orientation rubric. While
163. Latta v. Otter, 177 F.3d 456, 481-82 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
164. At the state level, one judge, Judge Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting in
part in the New Jersey Supreme Court same-sex marriage case, has implicitly ac-
knowledged that same-sex marriage bans also affect bisexuals. Without naming
bisexuals by name, she engaged in a roundabout illustrative hypothetical discussion
of a woman courted alternatively by a man and by a woman seeking to marry her,
which arguably “ ‘vindicates the rights of . . . bisexuals.’ ” See Boucai, supra note 12,
at 438-41, quoting Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have To Lose in Same-Sex Mar-
riage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1220 (2010) (citing Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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the same-sex marriage prohibitions obviously operate to the dis-
advantage of the people likely to wish to marry someone of the
same gender—i.e. lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and otherwise-
identified persons with same-sex attraction—the individuals’ actual
orientation is irrelevant to the application of the laws.165
Not only did Berzon acknowledge that bisexuals were also affected by
same-sex marriage bans, which discriminated on the basis of gender regard-
less of sexual orientation, she also explained that, therefore, intermediate
scrutiny should be the appropriate level of constitutional review.166 Berzon’s
concurrence in this respect can be invaluable in helping LGBT-rights liti-
gants frame their future arguments, both to be bisexual-inclusive and to
result in an application of heightened scrutiny to state actions that are dis-
criminatory against members of same-sex couples. From an advocate’s per-
spective, intermediate scrutiny might even be preferable to strict scrutiny for
two reasons. First, an appeal to intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scru-
tiny would bypass what some view as a problematic aspect of strict scrutiny
analysis: the immutable characteristic factor.167 Second, strict scrutiny is not
the end-all be-all of equal protection; in affirmative action cases, strict scru-
tiny is actually used to defeat remedial racial measures in equal protection
jurisprudence.168 In contrast, affirmative action programs explicitly benefit-
ing women, subject only to intermediate scrutiny, have been upheld.169
165. Latta, 177 F.3d at 482 n.5.
166. Latta, 177 F.3d at 484.
167. As previously discussed (see supra section II.A), the immutability issue may be one
reason LGBT-rights attorneys are wary of including bisexuals in their arguments,
because they incorrectly view bisexuals as having less immutable sexual orientations,
just because the fluidity of a non-binary orientation seems more subject to “change”
of some sort. However, immutability should not always be the primary criteria for
according strict scrutiny. See Greensmith, supra note 4, at 77-78 (analogizing to
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 2008) which recognized that
employment discrimination occurred against transgender person “because of” gender
even though the apparent gender of the plaintiff had changed; noting that various
scholars, including Reva Siegel and Ruth Colker, “have explored the possibility of
decreasing the emphasis on immutability; arguing that constitutional protection
should be based on the relative subordination of different groups, and not deter-
mined through the traditional Equal Protection analysis; and concluding that “re-
moving immutability from Equal Protection analysis or using anti- subordination
theory could be a way to insure the inclusion of all alternative sexualities [including
bisexuality] under the umbrella of sexual orientation”).
168. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down affirmative action
program under strict scrutiny); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)(same).
169. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding remedial gender-
based social security benefit program); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
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Thus, as between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, LGBT individu-
als are well positioned, especially with bisexuals and transgender litigants
highlighting the gendered nature of sexual orientation discrimination, to
make the case for an intermediate form of heightened scrutiny, beyond the
“rational basis with bite” standard applied in Romer, Lawrence, and
Windsor.170
Although the Supreme Court did not ultimately address the gender
discrimination issue in its Obergefell decision, at least one justice appeared to
flirt with the concept briefly two years prior; during the Hollingsworth v.
Perry oral argument, Justice Kennedy had inquired, “Do you believe this can
be treated as a gender-based classification? . . .  It’s a difficult question that
I’ve been trying to wrestle with it.”171
Other courts have also danced with the idea of LGBT-discrimination
as a form of gender discrimination.  The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Kitchen
v. Herbert, for example, affirmed a lower court ruling that Utah’s same-sex
marriage ban was a form of both unconstitutional sex and sexual orientation
discrimination.172 In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit joined Baehr v. Lewin,173
the Hawaii Supreme Court case that got the same-sex marriage litigation
ball rolling in temporarily striking down Hawaii’s marriage ban as an un-
constitutional form of gender discrimination.
With these cases, and the recent developments in EEOC litigation in
mind, bisexuals can help provide a bridge for future courts to traverse simi-
lar paths recognizing the intersectionality of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion and gender discrimination.
IV. TURNING THE PAGE: TOWARD GREATER BISEXUAL INCLUSIVITY
Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Latta may have been the first federal
opinion to explicitly include bisexuals in a same-sex marriage case, but her
opinion is not the only encouraging sign that courts are becoming more
receptive to bisexual-inclusive language. The fact that courts are now using
the phrase “same-sex marriage” rather than “gay marriage” (and, as dis-
cussed, are at times using “same-sex couples” in lieu of a less inclusive catch-
all “gays and lesbians” phrase to describe same-sex couples) is encouraging,
(upholding remedial gender-based federal statute giving female Naval officers addi-
tional years of commission service before subjecting them to mandatory discharge).
170. See Marcus, supra note 161, at 32-39 (addressing rational basis with bite as applied
to Windsor and preceding LGBT-rights Supreme Court decisions).
171. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144).
172. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1233 (10th Cir. 2014).
173. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (1993).
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in that “same-sex” terminology is inclusive of all individuals who marry
partners of the same sex, not just gays.
Where the Berzon concurrence may have the greatest impact in facili-
tating more inclusive legal discourse is her recognition that same-sex mar-
riage bans do not turn on a person’s sexual orientation; they harm all
members of same-sex couples, whether the members of same-sex couples
identify as gay, bisexual, or otherwise.174 Until more jurists and members of
the legal community come to similar recognitions and are willing to move
beyond simplistic binary distinctions, the harms resulting from excluding
bisexuals in the framing of LGBT-rights discourse and litigation will persist.
Bisexual erasure is shortsighted as well in its failure to realize, or perhaps
care about, the difficulty of reversing the effects of precedent that are poten-
tially harmful to bisexuals by continuing to render them invisible or “less
than” in the eyes of the law. The more that courts receive the message that
bisexuality is not a valid sexual orientation, the harder it is to undo that
damage.
The error of bisexual erasure is a graver misstep than the lack of pref-
erable semantics. No matter how strategically advantageous an attorney may
think it to keep the mention of bisexuality out of briefing, this strategy is
misguided and shortsighted, and one that does not further the integrity of a
justice system that relies on advocates to accurately portray their issues and
constituencies. To engage in bisexual erasure in the name of simplifying “the
message” is not to give courts much credit; they are better at tackling com-
plex issues than the average Joe, after all.  The more courts receive and act
upon the message that bisexuals are not worth mention in opinions address-
ing LGBT rights, the more difficult it will be in the long run to reverse the
harmful trend of bisexual erasure.
I am hopeful, however, that in the same-sex marriage context and be-
yond, there is an incremental but meaningful movement toward greater bi-
sexual inclusivity, as indicated by some recent developments.
One group of LGBT-rights litigators, the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, has gone to bat for bisexuals in its impact litigation. In 2010, the
NCLR became the first organization to represent a group of bisexual plain-
tiffs challenging their exclusion from an LGBT organization.175 The lawsuit
against the North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (a softball
league hosting the Gay Softball World Series tournament in Seattle), alleged
that the “Gay” softball league subjected bisexual men to invasive question-
ing and then excluded them from play as not being gay enough, in violation
174. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479-96 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
175. See Complaint, Apilado v. North Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Challenge, 792
F.Supp.2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00682).
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of state anti-discrimination laws, public accommodations laws, and other
rights.176 The softball players who brought the action described how they
had been summoned into a room where they were questioned in front of a
group of over two dozen observers by the North American Gay Amateur
Athletic Association and “were asked to state whether they were ‘predomi-
nantly’ attracted to men or to women.”177 When they asked if being bisex-
ual was a possible answer, were told, “this is the Gay World Series, not the
Bisexual World Series.”178 Without giving the men the option of identifying
as bisexual, the panel questioning them then labeled the men “non-gay” and
recommended disciplinary measures against the men and their softball
team, including disqualifying their team from the Gay World Series, for
having too many “non-gay” players.179 The NCLR achieved a settlement in
the case, including promises by the League of greater inclusivity and better
treatment of bisexuals in the future.180
While NCLR is the first to represent bisexual plaintiffs against a dis-
criminatory LGBT group, other organizations have also increasingly ac-
knowledged the importance of not subjecting an important segment of their
population to stigma, for example, engaging in name changes to be more
inclusive of both bisexuals and transgender members of their
communities.181
And bisexual members of the legal community ourselves have stepped
up. In 2013, I was one of several co-founders of the premiere national “Bi-
Law” organization for bisexual lawyers, law professors, law students and our
allies. On August 22, 2014, the National LGBT Bar Association hosted
BiLaw’s inaugural National BiLaw Caucus,182 which was met with a large
turnout of grateful, enthusiastic new BiLaw members, many of whom spoke
with great emotion about how long they have felt excluded from LGBT
legal discourse and communities, and how overdue such a group is.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 29, 36.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 39-43.
180. See Glazer, supra note 43, at 1000-01 n. 9 (citing Natalie Hope McDonald, The
Meaning of LGBT in Sports, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE’S G PHILLY, Nov. 29, 2011,
http://blogs.phillymag.com/gphilly/2011/11/29/meaning-lgbt-sports/.
181. As previously mentioned, the ACLU’s former Lesbian and Gay Rights Project has
been renamed The LGBT Project, see supra note 53.  Similarly, the National Lesbian
and Gay Task Force has been renamed National LGBTQ Task Force (see Mission &
History, NAT’L LGBTQ TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/about/mission-
history.html), and the Lesbian and Gay Law Association has been renamed the Na-
tional LGBT Bar Association (see THE NAT’L LGBT BAR ASS’N,
http://www.lgbtbar.org).
182. See Friday, August 22, 2014 - Lavender Law 2016, LGBT BAR FOUND., http://
lgbtbar.org/annual/program/friday-august-22-2014/.
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The following year, the National LGBT Bar Association continued the
tradition, hosting not only the second annual BiLaw Caucus, but also a
concurrent session specific to bisexual jurisprudence issues.183  In the year in
between, BiLaw’s work included not only filing the amicus brief in
Obergefell,184 but also giving various presentations by BiLaw members at
conferences and events across the country, including Harvard Law School’s
first ever Bisexuality Day,185 an educational podcast on bisexual jurispru-
dence,186 an Advocate Magazine op-ed on bisexual erasure in same-sex mar-
riage litigation,187 and the formation of a task force that provides comments
to agencies on regulatory issues relating to bisexuals.188
Since the filing of BiLaw’s amicus brief in Obergefell, at least one fed-
eral court has taken notice of the brief and taken steps toward greater bisex-
ual-inclusivity in its LGBT-rights analysis.  In Roberts v. United Parcel
Service,189 a federal district case in the Eastern District of New York involv-
ing a hostile work environment state civil rights law claim brought from a
lesbian employee claiming sexual orientation-based harassment, bisexuality
was not directly at issue.  Nonetheless, in his opinion upholding a jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff and rejecting the employer’s motions to set aside ver-
dict and for a new trial, Judge Weinstein seemed to go out of his way to
include references to the BiLaw brief in his extensive discussion of LGBT-
rights.  First, Judge Weinstein cited Lawrence, Romer, Windsor, Obergefell,
183. See Thursday, August 6, 2015 - Lavender Law 2016, LGBT BAR FOUND., http://
lgbtbar.org/annual/thursday-august-6-2015/ (advertising the BiLaw Caucus in addi-
tion to the “B: The Forgotten Letter in LGBT—Not Anymore” concurrent
workshop).
184. See Brief of Amicus Curiae BiLaw in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/AmicusBriefs/14-556_BiLaw.pdf.
185. See Bisexuality & Law at Harvard Law School!, HEYEVENT.COM, http://heyevent
.com/event/bnrwvfsbk5hzia/bisexuality-law-at-harvard-law-school (advertising “Bi-
Law: Bisexuality and Law at Harvard Law School”). See also, e.g., 2015 Workshop
Schedule, BECAUSE CONFERENCE, http://www.becauseconference.org/workshop-
schedule.html (“BiLaw! BiLawrriors Discuss Bringing Bisexuals to Legal Discourse
and Bringing the Law to Bisexuals”) and LGBT Diversity and Inclusion Conference,
OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, http://downloads.ohiobar.org/cle/2015/15-136.pdf (adver-
tising Ohio State Bar Association 2015 LGBT Diversity and Inclusion panel, “Visi-
bility: Serving Bisexual Clients and Bi-Specific Needs”).
186. See Interview with Nancy Marcus, Assistant Professor, Indiana Tech, THE BICAST,
http://www.thebicast.org/podcast/interview-bilaw-with-nancy-marcus/.
187. Toby Adams et al., Op-ed: How We’re Asking the Supreme Court to End Bi Erasure,
THE ADVOCATE MAGAZINE, Mar. 4, 2015, http://www.advocate.com/commentary/
2015/03/04/op-ed-how-were-asking-supreme-court-end-bi-erasure.
188. Letter from BiLaw to FDA (Jul. 14, 2015) (on file with author).
189. Roberts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. No. 13–CV–6161, 2015 WL 4509994
(E.D.N.Y. Jul. 27, 2015).
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and a Yale Law Journal Forum article to describe how federal courts have,
like the general public, “ ‘shifted their trajectory’ with respect to gay and
lesbian rights,” becoming more open to constitutional claims in LGBT-
rights cases.190  However, in the next breath, Weinstein added a “but see”
acknowledgment of BiLaw’s plea for greater inclusivity of bisexuals, ending
his string citation of LGBT-rights progress in the Court with the adden-
dum: “But see Brief of BiLaw as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
5, Obergefell, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2584, (“In litigation affecting gay
and bisexual individuals, there has been an unfortunate trend of bisexual
exclusion from briefings and court opinions.”).  The bisexual inclusivity
continued in the next paragraph; after citing a number of sources in a de-
tailed description of ongoing discrimination faced by LGBT individuals,
Weinstein again quoted BiLaw’s amicus brief to add the acknowledgement
that: “Bisexuals . . . face consistent prejudice and exclusion from both the
heterosexual and gay communities, and lack the same protective sense of
community when faced with bias and discrimination.”191 Not only did
Weinstein go out of his way to include these passages from BiLaw’s
Obergefell amicus brief but, even more critically, he employed language
through his comprehensive LGBT-rights opinion in Roberts that is, as Bi-
Law has implored from courts, bisexual-inclusive.  As compared to the al-
most complete lack of references to bisexuals as compared to lesbians and
gays detailed in the appendix of this Article, Judge Weinstein’s Roberts opin-
ion mentions bisexuals a whopping twenty-three times,192 a much-appreci-
ated gesture of inclusiveness in a case when the plaintiff was not even
identified as bisexual.
So, while BiLaw’s amicus brief may not have affected the terminology
in the Supreme Court’s terminology or that of the LGBT-rights advocates
in Obergefell, between Judges Weinstein and Berzon, the lower federal bench
is showing encouraging signs of receptivity toward our cries for greater in-
clusivity in this new era of equal rights and recognition under the law for
LGBT individuals.
As an organization, BiLaw’s work on this front is just beginning, as
the group moves forward in promoting greater visibility and understanding
of bisexuals in the legal community and in the law. For some, the impor-
tance of forming a “BiLaw” community is primarily to have a group they
can open up to without fear of biphobic reaction, a group of kindred spirits
to connect with after a long, dry spell of feeling like isolated minorities
190. Id. at *12 (quoting Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished
Business of Formal Equality, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 1, 5 (2015)).
191. Id. (quoting Brief of BiLaw as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
192. Id. at 10, 12-18.
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within a larger minority group. For others, we are looking forward to work-
ing together to establish more of a voice in legal discourse and litigation and
continuing the work from our inaugural years. Together, we are working to
build a “bi bridge” to bring bisexuality back into LGBT litigation and legal
dialogues and to reverse the trend of bi exclusion during this important
chapter in LGBT-rights history.
But we cannot do it alone. We need allies in the LGBT community,
in the broader legal community, and fair-minded jurists who do not want to
be complicit in perpetuating bisexual erasure to step up and do the right
thing as well. No longer should the rights of same-sex couples be framed
exclusively in terms of “homosexuals,” “gays” and “lesbians,” without men-
tion of the substantial number of bisexuals who are also in loving same-sex
relationships, but who, unlike gays and lesbians, have yet to be explicitly
accorded full protections under the law.
To begin with, jurists on the bench and allies off the bench can make
efforts to be more inclusive in their terminology, for example, using the bi-
inclusive phrases “LGBT individuals” and “same-sex couples” rather than
“gays and lesbians.” When referencing individuals affected by sexual orien-
tation-focused laws in particular (i.e., where gender identity is not at issue),
I recommend using the phrases “lesbian, gay and bisexual,” or even just “gay
and bisexual.”193 There are a number of linguistic options available that are
bisexual-inclusive, and there is no sufficient justification for continuing to
exclude us in legal discourse.
Courts and advocates involved in LGBT-rights litigation should also
bear in mind that the “same-sex” umbrella will not suffice in every case.
“Same-sex couples” are not always going to be the subject of LGBT-rights
litigation in future cases where same-sex partnerships are not directly at is-
sue.  Thus, to the extent that many rights of LGBT individuals remain at
issue, the comparatively inclusive “same-sex” catch-all will not, in fact, catch
all future cases.
As such, when the sexual orientation of individuals is at issue in future
cases, both litigants and courts must, to be more accurate and fair, develop a
greater comfort level with the phrases “gay and bisexual” or “gay, lesbian
and bisexual.” Where gender identity is also at issue, there is no reason why
LGBT-rights litigation should continue to shy away from use of the inclu-
sive “LGBT” acronym common to LGBT-rights discourse in non-legal are-
nas and media.  “Lesbian and gay” is dated, inaccurate, and perpetuates
193. Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of the
Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355 (2006) (explaining that use of the phrase
“gay and bisexual” encompasses gay men and women as well as bisexuals, and thus
leaves out no homo- or bisexual orientation).
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harmful exclusions among groups of persons who are already embattled
enough to begin with.
It is my hope that greater improvements toward bisexual inclusivity
will evolve in future years.  Toward that end, I propose the adoption by both
courts and LGBT-rights advocates of a new, more inclusive tone for LGBT-
rights terminology and discourse in opinions and litigation, one which em-
braces the concept of a “bi bridge” rather than engaging in continued bi
erasure, and which engages the “BT” as well as the “LG” aspects of LGBT
issues in LGBT-rights discourse. As with transgender inclusion, bisexual in-
clusion in LGBT-rights litigation and discourse would benefit the broader
legal and LGBT communities and improve the integrity and coherence of
our legal system as it addresses issues pertaining to gender, sexual identity,
and personal liberty. Being bi-inclusive is, quite simply, the right thing to
do.  It is not just time; it is overdue.  But it is not too late.
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APPENDIX
Survey of terminology within text of majority opinion/main LGBT-advocate party
briefs (statement of case/facts, summary of argument/introduction and argument sections
only, not including attachments, syllabus, table of contents, other brief sections).  Language
within quotations or titles is not counted.
“GAY AND
“GAY(S)” OR LESBIAN” OR “GAY




OR (WITHOUT SEX” OR
“LGBT/Q” “BISEXUAL(S)”) “BISEXUAL”) “SAME SEX” “BISEXUAL”
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES, 2015 0 4 16 75 0WL 2473451
Obergefell brief of plaintiffs-
petitioners plaintiff-petitioners 0 17 7 78 1
Obergefell et al
Obergefell brief of plaintiff- 0 0 15 105 0petitioners Tanco et al
Obergefell brief of plaintiff- 0 19 14 117 0petitioners DeBoer, et al
Obergefell brief of plaintiff- 0 14 12 110 0petitioners Bourke, et al
LATTA V. OTTER, 2014 WL 0 0 5 53 05151633 (9th Cir.)
Latta brief of plaintiffs-
appellees, Case No. 14-35420, 0 0 4 107 0Docket Entry 76-1 (9th Cir.
2014)
HERBERT V. KITCHEN, 755 0 1 2 90 0F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014)
Herbert brief of plaintiffs-
appellants, 2014 WL 897509 0 7 14 212 3
(10th Cir.)
1
(describingBOSTIC V. SCHAEFER, 760 F.3d 0 0 1 84 Romer352 (4th Cir. 2014) Amd. 2
language)
Bostic brief for Appellees, 2014 0 4 66 62 0WL 1398088 (4th Cir.)
BASKIN V. BOGAN, 766 F.3d 0 53 2 105 1648 (7th Cir. 2014)
Baskin brief of plaintiffs- 0 6 16 83 0appellees, 2014 WL 3909319
HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY, 0 0 0 8 0133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013)
Perry brief for respondents, 2013 0 6 89 43 0WL 648742
UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, 0 0 0 43 0133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)
Windsor brief of plaintiff- 0 27 30 41 0appellee, 2012 WL 3900586
1
(describingLAWRENCE V. TEXAS, 539 U.S. 0 53 0 13 Romer558 (2003) Amd. 2
language)
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“GAY(S)” OR “GAY AND




OR (WITHOUT SEX” OR
“LGBT/Q” “BISEXUAL(S)”) “BISEXUAL”) “SAME SEX” “BISEXUAL”








1Dale brief of respondents, 0 92 2 1 (describing2000 WL 340276 Hurley)
0, other
than quoting




Romer brief for respondents, paraphrases0 69 7 01995 WL 17008447 of Amd.
Language)
HURLEY V. IRISH–AMERICAN
GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL 0 1 2 0 6GROUP OF BOSTON, INC.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Hurley brief of Respondents, 0 3 1 2 81995 WL 143532
BOWERS V. HARDWICK, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)(overruled by 0 14 0 0 0
Lawrence v. Texas)
Bowers brief of Respondent, 0 10 0 1 01986 WL 720442
